concurring opinion of Cappy, J.
How later courts described this case
- concurring opinion of Cappy, J.
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled by Jones v. Chieffo, 549 Pa. 46 (1997)
549 Pa. 46, 700 A.2d 417 (1997) (overruling Dickens v. Horner, 531 Pa. 127, 611 A.2d 693 [1992], which held that the officer and his employer were immune under the tort claims act because the accident was caused by the criminal acts of the fleeing motorist);
Distinguished
Distinguished by Hummel v. PennDOT, 17 Pa. D. & C.4th 308 (1992)
We conclude that Dickens is distinguishable from this case and we do not interpret it to hold, as PennDOT suggests, that any criminal conduct by a third party is by definition a superseding cause.
The opinion
CAPPY, Justice,
concurring.
I join in the opinion of the majority insofar as it establishes that a municipality and its agents cannot be held liable for the superseding criminal or negligent acts of a third party. I endorse the position that the decision of a police officer, acting within the scope of his duties, to initiate vehicular pursuit of a person suspected of committing a crime, cannot constitute negligence.
However, I write separately to emphasize that, in my view, the decision of the majority does not eliminate liability claims against a municipality or its agents in instances where its own actions, as opposed to those of a third party, are the proximate cause of the injury.