reasoning that rationale for sobriety checkpoints applies equally to driver's license/registration checkpoints due to the "mass carnage" caused by unsafe automobiles and unlicensed drivers, but citing no statistics in support
How later courts described this case
- reasoning that rationale for sobriety checkpoints applies equally to driver's license/registration checkpoints due to the "mass carnage" caused by unsafe automobiles and unlicensed drivers, but citing no statistics in support
- stating that while justices’ comments about their views may “have some value in predicting how this court approaches the issue, ... this is not what we mean by precedential authority in our system of jurisprudence”
- recognizing that, in reviewing a suspicionless search under Article I, Section 8, the intrusion upon the individual is balanced against the government’s promotion of legitimate interests
- explaining that the intrusion upon a motorist by a DUI checkpoint is "minimal" where the checkpoint is substantially compliant with guidelines that ensure its constitutionality
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ZAPPALA, Justice,
dissenting.
Because I disagree with the majority’s initial premise that the constitutionality of a systematic roadblock is subject to a balancing analysis, I must vigorously dissent.
Article 1, Section 8 of our Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.” In Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 517 Pa. 277 , 535 A.2d 1035 (1987), I expressed my view that systematic roadblocks are repugnant to our State *178 Constitution. This view was in accord with our prior decision in Commonwealth v. Johnston, 515 Pa. 454 , 530 A.2d 74 (1987), in which we specifically rejected the balancing analysis of United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 , 103 S.Ct. 2637 , 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983), and instead adopted the dissenting view that such an analysis is inappropriate in evaluating the propriety of a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Because there existed articulable facts upon which to base a finding of probable cause, Article 1, Section 8, of our State Constitution was not violated in Johnston . As was the case in Tarbert , in the appeal sub judice we are not confronted with competing constitutional precepts but whether articulable facts are present to lead a police officer to believe that a crime is being committed. Since no such facts are present, I find the searches conducted here repugnant to Article 1, Section 8, of our State Constitution.
Furthermore, it is important to note that the grandiose roadblock conducted in this matter only discovered minute traffic and equipment violations. As a basis for finding the intrusion here constitutionally sound, the majority relies upon the government’s legitimate interest in insuring safety on highways. In light of the nature of this roadblock and the violations it produced 1 , I see this basis, as a reason for infringing upon a constitutional precept which has existed for over 200 years, as a shallow smoke screen.
Finally, the dangerous and abusive extension of the majority’s position can best be demonstrated by an appeal recently disposed of by the Superior Court. In Commonwealth v. Metz, 412 Pa.Super. 100 , 602 A.2d 1328 (1992), the Superior Court affirmed the suppression court’s refusal to suppress evidence seized as the result of an automobile driver’s refusal to proceed through a roadblock. In Metz , before reaching the checkpoint of a systematic roadblock, the driver stopped his vehicle, turned around and drove away. The officers conducting the roadblock immediately pursued the vehicle and *179 stopped it. The Superior Court affirmed the refusal of the trial court to suppress evidence concluding that “In view of Appellant’s conduct in attempting to avoid the roadblock ... we find it reasonable for these trained police officers to suspect that Appellant was in violation of the Vehicle Code or engaged in criminal activity.” 412 Pa.Super. at 113 , 602 A.2d at 1335 . Consequently, it is now impermissible to avoid a systematic roadblock. This obliteration of a constitutional right is premised on the fact that a systematic roadblock is reasonable and any effort to avoid it must be an attempt to shield criminal activity. Because I cannot condone the majority’s underlying premise, nor the logical extension of that analysis, I must dissent.
FLAHERTY, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.
CAPPY, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.
August 21, 1987
TO: Chief Joseph H. Maddox
FR: Sergeant Samuel G. Gilbert
RE: TRAFFIC CHECK
On Tuesday, August 20, 1987 at 2200hrs, our department conducted a traffic check on Rt. 216, at the Codorus Park Office. The check was conducted for a three hour period, ending at OlOOhrs, August 21, 1987. The following are the results of that check.
1. Ten citations issued for license violations.
2. Three citations issued for inspection violations.
3. One citation issued for registration violation.
4. Five faulty equipment cards issued for no drivers license.
5. Four faulty equipment cards issued for no registration.
6. Two faulty equipment cards issued for state inspection.
7. One faulty equipment card issued for equipment violation.
8. One warning card issued for change of address.
Samuel G. Gilbert
Sergeant Samuel G. Gilbert
. See addendum attached hereto which sets forth the violations discovered as a result of this roadblock.