holding that, when properly read in a common sense manner, first-degree murder indictment gave defendant adequate notice of the charges against him, although the criminal information did not specify the specific intent elements as to the unintended victim of shooting
How later courts described this case
- holding that, when properly read in a common sense manner, first-degree murder indictment gave defendant adequate notice of the charges against him, although the criminal information did not specify the specific intent elements as to the unintended victim of shooting
- holding that counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to challenge legally proper jury instructions
- explaining that this Court has upheld criminal indictments possessing a flaw and found them to be constitutional because they put the defendant on sufficient notice of the charge against him or her
- affirming the PCRA court’s grant of a new penalty phase where trial counsel failed to investigate and uncover a substantial amount of mitigation evidence, including juvenile court, school, and incarceration records that detailed a history of mood swings, auditory and visual hallucinations, and difficulty staying in *407 touch with reality.
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice CASTILLE
concurring and dissenting.
I join Mr. Justice Eakin’s Concurring and Dissenting Opinion. I write separately to address two discrete points con *251 cerning the remand, points which are unnecessary to Justice Eakin’s dissent, which focuses upon the performance of trial counsel.
First, on the question of appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness, which is the subject of the Majority’s remand, I reiterate the position outlined in my concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Freeman May, 587 Pa. 184 , 898 A.2d 559, 578 (Castille, J., concurring, joined by Cappy, C.J., and Eakin, J.) that counsel need not raise any and all potentially viable claims at risk of being deemed ineffective. Rather, “[cjounsel may forego even arguably meritorious issues in favor of claims which, in the exercise of counsel’s objectively reasonable professional judgment, offered a greater prospect of securing relief.” Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 572 Pa. 343, 815 A.2d 598, 613 (2002) (Opinion Announcing Judgment of Court). Here, direct appeal counsel raised a litany of claims including claims affecting the penalty phase and trial counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness for failing to present and argue additional points in mitigation. Any assessment upon remand must account for the deference that must be shown to direct appeal counsel’s judgment, under standards extant at the time of the direct appeal.
Second, the Majority, in a footnote, appears to pre-ordain the outcome of any inquiry into whether the claim upon which it remands was previously litigated on direct appeal. The Majority summarily concludes that the mitigation claim here is distinct from that which was raised on direct appeal, premising its conclusion upon a brief discussion in a single paragraph in the direct appeal opinion by this Court. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 530 Pa. 591 , 610 A.2d 931, 947 (1992). The proper measure of appellate counsel’s performance does not involve a limited examination of the opinion on appeal, but obviously must also encompass examination of the brief that counsel filed. On remand, the PCRA court must consider that brief in determining the question of previous litigation.