The opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
Justice SCHRODER.
I agree with and would affirm the Court of Appeals which held that the stop of Appellee/Cross-Appellant, Lamont Houston Brown, was constitutionally deficient, and that all of the evidence and statements flowing from the stop were therefore tainted and inadmissible. As to Brown’s protective cross-appeal, I agree with and would affirm the Court of Appeals’ opinion which requires suppression of the evidence and statements to the medical personnel and law enforcement.
The anonymous tipster’s knowledge, which had been corroborated only to the extent of Brown’s address, the car he drove, and, on the day of the arrest, that he was out, does not lend “indicia of reliability” to her claim that Brown was selling cocaine. These facts are readily observable, existed at the time of the call(s), and could be “predicted” by anyone with some familiarity with Brown. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. at 332, 110 S.Ct. at 2417, *637 110 L.Ed.2d at 310. Applying the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. at 271, 120 S.Ct. at 1379, 146 L.Ed.2d at 260, to the present case, “[k]nowledge about a person’s future movements indicates some familiarity with that person’s affairs, but having such knowledge does not necessarily imply that the informant knows, in particular, whether that person is ... [selling cocaine].” The conduct observed by the police officers on the day of the arrest, Brown’s sitting in the car in the parking lot of a restaurant during normal business hours, with a restaurant employee leaning in the window, cannot, in itself, be deemed suspicious activity. Importantly, the officers admitted they saw nothing change hands between Brown and York before “seizing” Brown by blocking him in with their cars. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. at 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d at 509.
Even though the officers’ assumptions were correct, the fact that evidence of illegal activity was ultimately discovered does not affect a Fourth Amendment analysis. J.L, 529 U.S. at 271, 120 S.Ct. at 1379, 146 L.Ed.2d at 260. Reasonable suspicion must be measured in terms of what was known before the person is seized. J.L. In light of White, this is a close case. In a close case, however, I believe we must err on the side of constitutional rights. Therefore, considering the totality of the circumstances, I believe the anonymous tip was not sufficiently corroborated to exhibit the required “indicia of reliability” for reasonable suspicion that Brown was engaging in criminal activity. Hence, I would hold the seizure of Brown was unlawful, and therefore, all evidence, including statements, obtained as a result thereof should have been suppressed as the “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). Accordingly, I would affirm the Court of Appeals on direct appeal and cross-appeal.