interpreting pre-emptive force of § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
How later courts described this case
- interpreting pre-emptive force of § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Belculfine v. Aloe, 112 F.3d 633 (1997)
Adam is inapplicable because that ease did not involve the question of what happens to wages and benefits that are accrued prepetition, but come due only in the post-petition period. 627 A.2d at 1189-90.
The opinion
WIEAND, Judge,
concurring:
I join the majority’s analysis. I write separately only because of my continuing belief that there is nothing discretionary about the entry of summary judgment by a trial court. Pa.R.C.P. 1035(b) permits a trial court to enter a summary judgment if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (emphasis added). Whether to enter a summary judgment is purely a question of law, and the entry of such a judgment will be reversed for an error of law. It is incorrect, therefore, to suggest that a trial court’s entry of summary judgment will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion.