holding in relevant part that “the Attorney General does not have the authority to act in the Legislature’s stead and dictate the remedy in a congressional redistricting case,” that his only authority in such cases is “to propose and suggest remedies and settle redistricting cases,” and emphasizing that “[b]ecause neither the Constitution nor a statute expressly gives the Attorney General legislative authority in redistricting cases, his claim that it exists is without merit.”
How later courts described this case
- holding in relevant part that “the Attorney General does not have the authority to act in the Legislature’s stead and dictate the remedy in a congressional redistricting case,” that his only authority in such cases is “to propose and suggest remedies and settle redistricting cases,” and emphasizing that “[b]ecause neither the Constitution nor a statute expressly gives the Attorney General legislative authority in redistricting cases, his claim that it exists is without merit.”
- recognizing that Texas Constitution’s “due course of law provision at a minimum requires notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner” (citing Than, 901 S.W.2d at 930 )
- holding redistricting triggers due course of law provision, requiring notice and opportunity to be heard at meaningful time and in meaningful manner
- "We have recognized that our due course of law provision at a minimum requires notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.... This right [to be heard] also includes an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, to produce witnesses, and to be heard on questions of law."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice RODRIGUEZ,
joined by Justice ENOCH and Justice JEFFERSON, concurring.
I join fully in the Court’s opinion, but I write separately because I share the concerns raised by Justice Hecht in Part 11(B) of his opinion regarding the propriety of the trial court’s consideration of incumbency protection issues in formulating its plan. 67 S.W.3d at 100 (Hecht, J.,. dissenting). The changes asked for by Speaker Laney and ultimately adopted by the trial court in plan 1089C, while not couched in terms of incumbent protection, are not so distinct from incumbent protection as to escape suspicion. And I would caution on remand that the trial court may not consider incumbent protection in drawing Congressional district lines.
That the trial court used incumbent protection as a factor in drawing the district lines for plan 1089C is an issue raised by the Attorney General in his Appellant’s Brief and by others. I believe it is appropriate for this Court to provide guidance to *98 the trial court on this issue on remand. See, e.g., Dallas Mkt. Ctr. Dev. Co. v. Liedeker, 958 S.W.2d 382, 385 (Tex.1997) (considering an issue raised by a party to provide guidance to the district court on remand); Edinburg Hosp. Auth. v. Trevino, 941 S.W.2d 76, 81 (Tex.1997) (considering an issue “not essential to [the Court’s] disposition of th[e] case ... to provide the trial court with guidance in the retrial of [the] case”).