concluding in plurality opinion that trial court may not consider fault in division of marital estate when “dissolution of marriage is sought solely on the ground of insupportability”
How later courts described this case
- concluding in plurality opinion that trial court may not consider fault in division of marital estate when “dissolution of marriage is sought solely on the ground of insupportability”
- affirming trial court’s disproportionate division of property in favor of wife based, in part, on evidence that wife’s parents retained some rights to property, including income, when parents deeded real property to husband and wife
- finding that it was legislature's intent to make decree of no-fault divorce mandatory if party alleges insupportability and establishes statutory elements
- finding no abuse of discretion where trial court used appraisal done eight months before trial
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DON BURGESS, Justice.
DISSENTING OPINION
I respectfully dissent. The majority finds the trial court erred in considering fault and I agree. They go on to hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the division of the community estate. 1 I can not reach the same conclusion. It is clear, at least to me, the trial court considered fault in dividing the community estate. I say it is clear because it appears the trial court divided the estate according to Ms. Phillips’s proposed division and accepted her assigned values totally. Therefore, I am forced to conclude that the error found by the majority probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. Tex. R.App. P. 44.1(a)(1). Consequently, I would reverse and remand for a new trial on the property division.
. This court has approved unequal divisions, but these were not based upon an erroneous premise.