stating that double counting a ____________________________________________ 3 Rule 2119(f) provides that “[a]n appellant who challenges the discretionary aspects of a sentence in a criminal matter shall set forth in his brief a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of a sentence.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). -7- J-S81010-18 defendant’s prior record score raises a substantial question
How later courts described this case
- stating that double counting a ____________________________________________ 3 Rule 2119(f) provides that “[a]n appellant who challenges the discretionary aspects of a sentence in a criminal matter shall set forth in his brief a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of a sentence.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). -7- J-S81010-18 defendant’s prior record score raises a substantial question
- finding a substantial question raised where the appellant asserted that the sentencing -4- J-S12030-24 court “impos[ed] a sentence outside the guidelines without providing adequate reasons, and relied on factors already taken into account in determining his prior record score and offense gravity score[.]”
- stating that “where a defendant merely asserts that his sentence is inconsistent with the Sentencing Code or contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing scheme without explaining how or why, we cannot determine whether he has raised a substantial question.”
- holding that the court’s awareness of the evidence adduced at trial and certain information received during the oral colloquy was no substitute for the “searching inquiry” required of a presentence investigation
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by In Re LA, 853 A.2d 388 (2004)
Id. Obviously, these requirements are inapplicable in juvenile proceedings.
Distinguished by In the Interest of L.A., 2004 Pa. Super. 237 (2004)
Id. Obviously, these requirements are inapplicable in juvenile proceedings.
The opinion
STEVENS, J.,
dissenting:
¶ 1 I respectfully dissent. I agree with the Majority that the trial court abused its discretion in dispensing with a pre-sen-tence report on the basis that Philadelphia county’s prison system would be “overburdened” with state prisoners while awaiting a pre-sentence report.
¶ 2 However, I would find that in this case, a review of the record indicates that there was sufficient additional background information obtained by the trial court with its colloquy with the defendant. On that basis, I would find that the trial court’s decision not to order a P.S.I. report was discretionary with the trial court, and there was no abuse of discretion.
¶ 3 Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the trial court to not order a P.S.I. under the facts of the within case.