finding that a “bald[] assert[ion] that all prior counsel were ineffective for failing to litigate the issue[,]” which was “tacked - 16 - J-S25009-17 on to waived claims of trial court error[,] do not discharge [the] appellant’s burden of proving ineffectiveness”
How later courts described this case
- finding that a “bald[] assert[ion] that all prior counsel were ineffective for failing to litigate the issue[,]” which was “tacked - 16 - J-S25009-17 on to waived claims of trial court error[,] do not discharge [the] appellant’s burden of proving ineffectiveness”
- stating that Post Conviction Relief Act8 petitioner’s boilerplate allegation that all prior counsel were ineffective for failing to litigate issues that had been waived did not discharge an appellant’s burden of proving their ineffectiveness
- holding that affidavit of alleged recantation witness provided no basis for PCRA relief on after-discovered evidence claim where statement merely asserted that the witness had "no knowledge" of crime and thus was not exculpatory
- explaining that PCRA petitioner must purse a distinct ineffectiveness claims to circumvent the waiver of the underlying claim of trial court error that could have been previously litigated
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice SAYLOR,
concurring.
I concur in the result and write to make two points.
The first concerns the reasoning applied by the majority in disposing of Appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to the extent that it is premised on deficiencies in the appellate briefing. By way of background, in Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553 , 782 A.2d 517 (Pa.2001), a majority of this Court expressed its intention to continue to afford a degree of latitude in deciding whether arguments in post-conviction appellate briefs concerning ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are sufficient to invoke merits review of a claim for relief. 1 Subsequently, in Commonwealth v. Lambert, 568 Pa. 346 , 797 A.2d 232 (2001) (opinion announcing the judgment of the Court), the lead opinion acknowledged Williams’ facial applicability, see Lambert, 568 Pa. at 365 , 797 A.2d at 243 , but nonetheless rejected the applicable claims on the basis of insufficient development in the appellate briefs. Presently, the majority rejects several of Appellant’s claims upon substantially the same basis. 2 Where Williams is appli *622 cable, I disagree with the idea that there should be some additional hurdle- once an appellant has presented argument sufficient to demonstrate an entitlement to merits review before merits review (in terms of examination by an appellate court of the post-conviction record) will actually be afforded. I am therefore uncomfortable with the rubric employed by the majority in its analysis here, since the verbiage has been used to suggest this sort of an intermediate step. 3
Second, as concerns the claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel in the investigation and presentation of evidence of mitigating circumstances in the penalty phase of trial, the majority emphasizes the precept that the reasonableness of counsel’s investigation and preparation often depends critically on information supplied by the defendant and his family. See Majority Opinion, op. 572 Pa. at 609-611, 819 A.2d at 45-46. I believe that it is equally fundamental to expressly recognize that whether critical information is elicited from the defendant and his family often depends upon the sufficiency of counsel’s interviews and investigation. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Basemore, 560 Pa. 258, 290 , 744 A.2d 717, 785 (2000) (“different light falls upon counsel’s performance depending upon whether he asked and was not told, or he did not ask and therefore was not told” (citation omitted)). Here, however, although certainly Appellant is able to identify several weaknesses concerning the manner in which the penalty phase investigation was conducted, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that counsel’s efforts (particularly in the employment of and reliance on a forensic psychologist in the investigation) were sufficient to meet the applicable Sixth Amendment standard.
. Williams explained this approach in terms of its recognition of the difficulty facing post-conviction counsel, since claims of appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness are generally derivative claims, see id. at 567 n. 5, 782 A.2d at 526 n. 5, as well as in terms of maintaining balance and fairness in the capital review process in light of other changes that have been implemented restricting review. See id. at 569 , 782 A.2d at 527 .
. Compare Majority Opinion, op. 572 Pa. at 601, 819 A.2d at 40 ("Such boilerplate allegations tacked on to waived claims of trial court error do not discharge appellant’s burden of proving ineffectiveness.” (citations omitted)), with Lambert, 568 Pa. at 365 , 797 A.2d at 243 ("[i]n this *622 merits analysis, it is clear that appellant's failure to forward relevant argumentation as to each necessary 'individual facet' of the Strickland standard dooms his boilerplate claims to failure").
. As the majority notes, in the present case, the same attorney represented Appellant at trial and on direct appeal, and, accordingly, it is not necessary to independently consider the stewardship of direct appeal counsel with regard to issue presentation and preservation on the same terms as presented in Williams .