holding that appellant's sentence of 10-30 years did not exceed the maximum punishment of life imprisonment
How later courts described this case
- holding that appellant's sentence of 10-30 years did not exceed the maximum punishment of life imprisonment
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FERREN, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
Before trial, in order to set the stage for enhancing appellant’s sentence under D.C. Code § 22-3202 (a)(2) (1981), the prosecutor filed an Information reflecting a Maryland conviction. That conviction, however, could not have served as the basis of an enhanced sentence under the statute. After appellant was convicted, the prosecutor erroneously “urged the court during sentencing allocution that a mandatory mini *165 mum sentence was required here.” Ante at 163 & n. 2. The trial court then said it had “ ‘no alternative but to impose a meaningful sentence of incarceration.’ ” Ante at 163.
Although the majority analysis may be plausible, it also smacks of bootstrapping. The information was inapplicable but not “invalid on its face.” Ante at 163. In view of the prosecutor’s erroneous representation, we cannot discount the possibility that the busy trial court may have failed to note its inapplicability.
To eliminate all doubt, and thus to assure the integrity of the sentencing process, I would remand for resentencing. If the trial court did not believe it was required to enhance the sentence by reference to the Maryland conviction, it can say so. On the other hand, if the court did improperly take that conviction into account, it can revise the sentence accordingly. Such resentenc-ing cannot possibly prejudice the government, and it will lift any possible cloud on the sentence in fairness to appellant.
Respectfully, therefore, I dissent.