holding that allegation of counsel’s ineffectiveness cannot be ____________________________________________ 4 Specifically, Appellant’s pro se PCRA petition alleged: “Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. I have no knowledge of the law & I have a very low educational level. I am requesting counsel. My Direct Appeal Counsel lost [a]ll of my paperwork, including my transcript.” (PCRA Petition, filed 2/19/19, at 5). -6- J-S04027-23 invoked as “new fact” exception to time-bar, except where counsel abandons client on appeal
How later courts described this case
- holding that allegation of counsel’s ineffectiveness cannot be ____________________________________________ 4 Specifically, Appellant’s pro se PCRA petition alleged: “Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. I have no knowledge of the law & I have a very low educational level. I am requesting counsel. My Direct Appeal Counsel lost [a]ll of my paperwork, including my transcript.” (PCRA Petition, filed 2/19/19, at 5). -6- J-S04027-23 invoked as “new fact” exception to time-bar, except where counsel abandons client on appeal
- stating PCRA time limitations implicate our jurisdiction and may ____________________________________________ 3 We note that the issue of whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s petition to reinstate his appellate rights is not before this Court, and we do not address it. -4- J-S44008-14 not be altered or disregarded to address the merits of the petition
- holding that the petitioner alleged sufficient facts that, if proven, would satisfy the exception where he pled that he was unaware that his PCRA appeal had been dismissed because counsel failed to file a brief, he detailed “the steps he took to ascertain the status of his case,” and he filed the petition promptly after discovering the dismissal
- explaining that a petitioner’s “reliance on Section 9543 as a basis for asserting an after-discovered-evidence claim under the PCRA, [] did not suspend [his] initial obligation to establish jurisdiction by alleging and proving (a) the existence of facts that were unknown to him and (b) his exercise of due diligence in discovering those facts”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice EAKIN,
Dissenting.
I dissent because I believe Commonwealth v. Chester, 586 Pa. 468 , 895 A.2d 520 (2006) controls this matter.
Under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et seq., all petitions, including second or subsequent petitions, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes final, unless one of the statutory exceptions applies. Chester , at 522 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1); Commonwealth v. Yarris, 557 Pa. 12 , 731 A.2d 581 (1999)). The PCRA’s time-bar is jurisdictional in nature. Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 554 Pa. 547 , 722 A.2d 638, 641 (1998). Appellant argues this Court should consider his PCRA petition under the exception to the one-year time limitation in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). This subsection requires a petitioner to prove the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to him and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence. Chester recognized “for purposes of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii), information is not ‘unknown’ to a PCRA petitioner when the information was a matter of public record.” Chester , at 523 (citing Commonwealth v. Lark, 560 Pa. 487 , 746 A.2d 585 , 588 n. 4 (2000); Commonwealth v. Whitney, 572 Pa. 468 , 817 A.2d 473, 478 (2003)). Under Chester , it is clear information that is a matter of public record — like the dismissal of an appeal — is not “unknown” to a PCRA petitioner. Therefore, appellant cannot meet § 9545(b)(1)(ii).
Because the time-bar is jurisdictional, and this PCRA petition is clearly time-barred, I respectfully dissent.
Justice CASTILLE joins this dissenting opinion.