The opinion
HESTER, Judge,
concurring:
I join in the scholarly opinion by Judge Kelly, but write separately because I believe appellant did not carry a concealed weapon and that his conviction was therefore erroneous. Although appellant’s counsel raised this issue in post-trial motions and the trial court addressed the issue in its opinion, counsel inexplicably abandoned the issue of concealment on appeal. We cannot properly treat the issue on its merits, for it has been waived. Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a), 2119(a); Commonwealth v. Balch, 328 Pa.Super. 71, 76 , 476 A.2d 458, 461 (1984); Rago v. Nace, 313 Pa.Super. 575, 578 , 460 A.2d 337, 339 (1983); Commonwealth v. Sanford, 299 Pa.Super. 64, 67 , 445 A.2d 149, 150-51 (1982); Commonwealth v. Harper, 292 Pa.Super. 192 , 196 n. 3, 436 A.2d 1217 , 1219 n. 3 (1981).
Nevertheless, the issue is Of substantial importance to appellant, and I believe the trial court erred in its treatment of the issue involving the concealment of the weapon.
*412 The trial court correctly cited Commonwealth v. Butler, 189 Pa.Super. 399, 403 , 150 A.2d 172, 173 (1959), for the proposition that the “issue of concealment depends on the particular circumstances present in each case and is a question for the trier of fact to resolve in reaching a decision.” Slip op., 10/8/85, at 2. The court, however, characterized the issue as one of credibility when, in fact, there was no conflict in the testimony.
Butler and a line of cases following it hold that when there is conflicting evidence, concealment is a question for the fact-finder. Commonwealth v. Butler, supra, 189 Pa. Superior Ct. at 403 , 150 A.2d at 173 (Butler had attempted to conceal the gun from police officers by passing it to his wife); Commonwealth v. Nickol, 476 Pa. 75, 81 , 381 A.2d 873, 876-77 (1977) (evidence from which trier of fact could infer that Nickol concealed gun prior to robbery); Commonwealth v. Pressley, 433 Pa. 163, 166 , 249 A.2d 345, 346 (1969) (evidence from which fact-finder could infer that Pressley had removed the gun from under his sweater); Commonwealth v. Horshaw, 237 Pa.Super. 76, 80 , 346 A.2d 340, 342-43 (1975) (robbery victim testified that Horshaw pulled gun from his abdomen and victim first saw it when it was coming up by Horshaw’s side); Commonwealth v. Harris, 195 Pa.Super. 606, 608-09 , 171 A.2d 850, 851 (1961) (testimony very much in conflict but Harris seen drawing gun from his jacket by one witness and seen drawing some object from his pocket by others).
When, however, there is no conflict in the evidence, there is no issue of credibility to be resolved by the trier of fact. I believe this case is indistinguishable from Commonwealth v. Williams, 237 Pa.Super. 91 , 346 A.2d 308 (1975), overruled on other grounds, Commonwealth v. Foster, 250 Pa.Super. 32 , 34 n. 3, 378 A.2d 438 , 439 n. 3 (1977). Williams was seen in the City of Philadelphia firing a handgun at a passing automobile, walking to the corner, spinning the gun and tossing it from hand to hand. Then, Williams “stuck the gun in his belt, turned around and walked away.” Id., 237 Pa.Superior Ct. at 93, 346 A.2d at 309. Following Williams’ conviction of carrying a concealed *413 weapon, this court reversed, stating: “In the instant case there is no evidence whatsoever as to any attempt by appellant to conceal any weapon; and, therefore, we must conclude that the evidence was insufficient to sustain appellant’s conviction as to Section 6106.” Id., 237 Pa.Superior Ct. at 95, 346 A.2d at 310. As in Williams , there is no evidence in this case that appellant attempted to conceal his weapon.
Although appellant failed to argue this issue, the Commonwealth did address it. The Commonwealth states that appellant’s
explanation that he intended to place the gun on a wall would have merit if it were not for the way in which he was carrying the gun in the meantime. People just don’t walk around with guns stuck in their pants, having the gun butt sticking out just enough so that others will realize that he is armed if the real intention is to place the gun on a wall.
Brief for appellee at 3 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, had the issue been argued on appeal, I would have reversed the conviction and discharged appellant. As it was not argued, I am constrained to join Judge Kelly’s opinion which correctly addresses the other arguments of appellant.