stating that “barring explicit evidence in the record to the contrary, we presume that any hearing judge in conducting ... any [ ] legal proceeding, understands and carries out his or her obligation to follow the law”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “barring explicit evidence in the record to the contrary, we presume that any hearing judge in conducting ... any [ ] legal proceeding, understands and carries out his or her obligation to follow the law”
- agreeing with the attorney’s concession that his conduct, “altering] the law firm’s computer files to make it appear that the cases were meritless and therefore ‘closed’ ... with the intention of taking those clients from the law firm and making them his, once he established his own practice,” constituted a violation of Rule 8.4(c), among other *342 Rules
- stating that hearing judge’s failure to mention certain facts does not mean he or she failed to consider those facts, and does not warrant the grant of an exception
- “[W]hen it appears that the attorney has engaged in intentional dishonest conduct ... disbarment will be the appropriate sanction absent compelling extenuating circumstances.” (citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JOHN C. ELDRIDGE (Retired, Specially Assigned),
dissenting.
In this case, I would impose a sanction of an indefinite suspension rather than disbarment. Among this Court’s prior attorney grievance cases, the present case is most similar to Attorney Grievance Commission v. Potter, 380 Md. 128 , 844 A.2d 367 (2004), in which the Court unanimously imposed a ninety-day suspension. The facts of the present case are not significantly different from the facts in Potter . The imposition of a suspension in the case at bar would comport with consistency and a respect for precedent.
Chief Judge BELL and Judge MURPHY join this dissenting opinion.