finding that the Gaming Board applied the correct test in deciding whether the license should be revoked, that the revocation guidelines were not unconstitutionally vague as applied, that the Debtor was given 'the opportunity to be heard, that there was evidence to support the Gaming Board’s decision, and that revocation of the $50 million license was not an excessive sanction
How later courts described this case
- finding that the Gaming Board applied the correct test in deciding whether the license should be revoked, that the revocation guidelines were not unconstitutionally vague as applied, that the Debtor was given 'the opportunity to be heard, that there was evidence to support the Gaming Board’s decision, and that revocation of the $50 million license was not an excessive sanction
- rejecting the Debtor’s claim that revocation of the $50 million license was unreasonably harsh, and finding that lesser sanctions, such as the previously imposed monetary sanctions amounting to more than $650,000 in fines, were not available
- noting that “[gjovernment licenses to engage in a business or occupation create an entitlement to partake of a profitable activity, and, therefore, are property rights.”
- noting that “[g]overnment licenses to engage in a business or occupation create an entitlement to partake of a profitable activity, and, therefore, are property rights.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge McCullough.
I respectfully dissent. As noted in Judge Leavitt’s Concurring Opinion, the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board’s Bureau of Investigation sought to revoke the Category 2 Slot Machine License (License) issued to Philadelphia Entertainment and Development Partners, L.P. (PEDP) on the basis that PEDP was no longer financially fit or suitable to hold the License. PEDP’s financial fitness and suitably were vigorously disputed by the parties and the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board (Board) was required to make factual findings in order to resolve this dispute, thereby precluding a revocation of PEDP’s License by way of summary judgment. Indeed, the Majority recognizes that summary judgment is only appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Guy M. Cooper, Inc. v. E. Penn Sch. Dist., 903 A.2d 608 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006).
Moreover, as counsel for PEDP noted at argument, by revoking PEDP’s License, PEDP will be required to forfeit a $50 million licensing fee paid to the Board. By affirming the Board’s final order, the Majority, in essence, confirms the application of a summary forfeiture process with regard to a sizable property interest ($50 million fee), without a hearing. Summary forfeiture proceedings in other contexts have been disfavored for some time as unfair, unduly harsh and unconstitutional. Mazzo v. Board of Pensions and Retirement, 531 Pa. 78 , 611 A.2d 193 (1992); In re Adoption of M.T.T., 467 Pa. 88 , 354 A.2d 564 (1976); Commonwealth v. Cox, 161 Pa.Cmwlth. 589 , 637 A.2d 757 (1994); and Commonwealth v. 502-504 Gordon Street, 147 Pa.Cmwlth. 330 , 607 A.2d 839 (1992), affirmed, 535 Pa. 515 , 636 A.2d 626 (1994). I believe those decisions are applicable here and accordingly, I would reverse the Board’s final order and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing.