describing contributory negligence as a matter of law as “the exceptional case”
How later courts described this case
- describing contributory negligence as a matter of law as “the exceptional case”
- the jury decided that the taxi cab owed a duty to ensure the crosswalk was clear before driving through the intersection
- noting that the jury weighs witness credibility and resolves disputes regarding speed and distances
- “It is only in a case where the facts are undisputed and, considering every legitimate inference, only one conclusion may be drawn, that the trial court may rule as a matter of law on ... proximate cause” (citations omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FERREN, Associate Judge,
with whom NEWMAN, Chief Judge, joins, concurring:
While I join in Judge KELLY’s opinion for the court, I would add that the facts here, manifesting negligence by the drivers of both vehicles, provide a classic illustration of why legislatures or courts — in 36 jurisdictions to date — have adopted the doctrine of comparative negligence. See Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill.2d 1, 11-14 , 52 Ill.Dec. 23 , 28-33, 421 N.E.2d 886, 891-95 (1981). See generally R. E. Keeton, Venturing To Do Justice 45-53, 85-89 (1969).