jury must find that defendant had ‘‘specific intent to cause serious physical injury to the victim at the time of the discharge of the gun,’’ and, therefore, evidence of ‘‘motive at the time [the defendant] took possession of the gun . . . is not the time the jury must focus [on] in finding specific intent’’ (emphasis added)
How later courts described this case
- jury must find that defendant had ‘‘specific intent to cause serious physical injury to the victim at the time of the discharge of the gun,’’ and, therefore, evidence of ‘‘motive at the time [the defendant] took possession of the gun . . . is not the time the jury must focus [on] in finding specific intent’’ (emphasis added)
- “proper jury instructions on the elements of self defense [were necessary] so that the jury [could] ascertain whether the state [had] met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the assault [had] not [been] justified”
- ‘‘[o]nly in the most excep- tional circumstances will this court consider even a constitutional claim not properly raised and decided in the trial court’’
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Arthur H. Healey, J.
(concurring). I concur with the result reached by the majority. I write separately because I do not agree, as the majority states, that if that portion of the charge relating to accident “were considered in isolation,” it would permit the jury to return a guilty verdict upon a finding that “the defendant had an improper motive when he took possession of the gun, improperly handled the gun, or carried the gun outside for any purpose other than self defense, when any such action was followed by an improper gesture resulting in the discharge of the gun.”
The court charged in relevant part as follows: “And, so on that defense of pure accident, I am *673 going to ask you to examine very closely: why did he have that gun with him at the time, because if he took that gun for an improper motive, whether to shoot [the victim], then pure accident is out of the picture. If he brought it over solely for the purpose of defending himself and, through no fault of his or improper gesture on his part or improper assault on his part, the gun went off through some complete accident, then you may accept this defense.” I believe this portion of the charge, even in isolation, allows the jury to do nothing more than rule out the defense of accident if they found that the defendant took the gun with an improper motive. I do not believe that this portion of the charge could reasonably be understood to permit the jury to find the defendant guilty of assault merely upon such a showing. There certainly can be no quarrel with the proposition that a finding of specific intent to cause serious physical injury to the victim is necessary to find a person guilty of this crime. General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1); State v. Robinson, 174 Conn. 604 , 392 A.2d 475 (1978). I just do not believe that the court’s instructions here could reasonably be understood to dilute that requirement. Therefore, I would find no error, and not harmless error, with this portion of the charge.