finding that the “coordinate jurisdiction rule [which] serves to protect the expectations of the parties, insure uniformity of decisions, [and] to maintain consistency in proceedings” by preventing one court from overruling the prior decision of a judge from the same court, may be departed from for "exceptional circumstances” which include "a change in the controlling law.”
How later courts described this case
- finding that the “coordinate jurisdiction rule [which] serves to protect the expectations of the parties, insure uniformity of decisions, [and] to maintain consistency in proceedings” by preventing one court from overruling the prior decision of a judge from the same court, may be departed from for "exceptional circumstances” which include "a change in the controlling law.”
- holding that section 7111 sets forth a bright line bar to the disclosure of mental health records, even to the court, thereby depriving the alleged victim of a brutal physical and sexual assault by a mental health patient from potentially relevant information in her personal injury claim against her assailant and the hospital where he was an inpatient
- upholding the clearly erroneous/manifest injustice exception to the law of the case doctrine in those circumscribed cases in which the prior court’s ruling was so clearly erroneous that it would create a manifest injustice that would be, in essence, plainly intolerable, if followed
- explaining that the coordinate jurisdiction rule “provides that judges of coordinate jurisdiction should not overrule each other’s decisions.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*252 Justice NIGRO,
concurring.
While I have previously questioned the validity of the “manifest injustice” exception to the coordinate jurisdiction rule, 1 a majority of this Court has embraced that exception. See Gerrow, 572 Pa. 134 , 813 A.2d 778 (recognizing exception to coordinate jurisdiction rule when prior order was clearly erroneous and would create a manifest injustice if followed). I nevertheless continue to believe that any such exception should be applied only in extremely limited circumstances. Thus, a judge should not label a prior order to be “clearly erroneous” merely because he disagrees with that order, but rather, it must be virtually undisputable that the prior judge erred. Similarly, it should not be considered a “manifest injustice” that an erroneous prior order will merely delay correct resolution of a case, but rather, adherence to the prior order must be such that it will cause considerable substantive harm aside from delay and, as the majority states, will result in a situation that is “plainly intolerable.” Op. at 30. As I believe both of these requirements of the “manifest injustice” exception were satisfied in the instant case, 2 1 concur with the majority that Judge Alejandro did not violate the coordinate jurisdiction rule in refusing to enforce Judge Sheppard’s order. 3
. Gerrow v. John Royle & Sons, 572 Pa. 134 , 813 A.2d 778, 787-92 (2002) (Nigro, J., dissenting), and Ryan v. Berman, 572 Pa. 156 , 813 A.2d 792, 796-99 (2002) (Nigro, J., dissenting).
. While the majority dubs this exception the "clearly erroneous” exception, which emphasizes the first prong of the test, I favor emphasizing the second prong and calling the exception the "manifest injustice” exception. My ongoing concern regarding this exception is that without strict limitations, judges will use it too liberally to reverse prior orders with which they merely disagree. As such, my preference is to underscore that the order must be more than simply "clearly erroneous” in the eyes of the subsequent judge, but rather, must clearly threaten to cause a "plainly intolerable” manifest injustice.
. I feel compelled to point out that had the Superior Court accepted Judge Sheppard's certification of his order for appeal, this coordinate jurisdiction question would have been avoided altogether. While I recognize that it is within the Superior Court's discretion whether to permit an interlocutory appeal from an order that the trial court has certified, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b), it appears that the Superior Court may have abused that discretion here.