holding that "even a somewhat lengthy delay will not always prevent a statement from being admissible under Rule 803(c)(2)" because the Rule focuses instead "on whether nervous excitement was generated, whether there was a reasonable proximity in time between the event and the declarant's subsequent description of it, and whether there was a lack of opportunity to deliberate or fabricate the circumstances"
How later courts described this case
- holding that "even a somewhat lengthy delay will not always prevent a statement from being admissible under Rule 803(c)(2)" because the Rule focuses instead "on whether nervous excitement was generated, whether there was a reasonable proximity in time between the event and the declarant's subsequent description of it, and whether there was a lack of opportunity to deliberate or fabricate the circumstances"
- finding the defendant's previous incarceration and indictment for the attempted murder of a victim admissible in defendant's trial for arranging the murder of the victim because the evidence was relevant to the defendant's motive, intent, and plan to commit the murder
- noting that “[i]n deciding whether there was an opportunity to fabricate or deliberate, a court should consider ‘the element of time, the circumstances of the incident, the mental and physical condition of the declarant, and the nature of the utterance’” (quoting State v. Williams, 106 N.J.Super. 170, 172, 254 A.2d 538, 540 (App.Div.) (per curiam), certif. denied, 55 N.J. 78, 259 A.2d 228 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1057, 90 S.Ct. 1405, 25 L.Ed.2d 675 (1970))
- finding the hearsay rule, N.J.R.E. 801(c), applies when testimony is offered to prove the truth of the statement attributed to the declarant
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
PORITZ, C.J.,
concurring.
Like my colleagues, I would admit the statements made by defendant to Tracey on August 27 and 28 under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(2) and (3). I write separately to note that although the res gestae principle, standing alone, has been discredited by scholars as a basis to admit otherwise inadmissible evidence, where, as here, its use is tethered to specific Evidence Rules, it remains a useful interpretive tool.
Justice LONG joins in this concurrence.