stating that the predecessor to § 781(d) “is concerned only with victim impact evidence that is submitted to the court or jury by way of a statement included in a presentence investigation report”
How later courts described this case
- stating that the predecessor to § 781(d) “is concerned only with victim impact evidence that is submitted to the court or jury by way of a statement included in a presentence investigation report”
- asserting that "[w]hile what we say in this posture may be characterized as obiter dicta, we feel an urgency to speak in the hope of avoiding the burden of further appeals with respect to the issues discussed"
- finding prior crimes evidence improperly admitted when record was "devoid of evidence that the crime was in fact committed"
- "We have stated our view that a suspect must be fully informed of the actual presence and availability of counsel who seeks to confer with him, in order that any waiver of a right to counsel, as established by Miranda, can be knowing and intelligent"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ELDRIDGE, Judge,
concurring.
I agree with the judgment and with all portions of the Court’s opinion except the section dealing with victim impact evidence. The views expressed in that section are dicta. Furthermore, the matter may not arise again in this case after our reversal and remand. As both the majority opinion and Judge Cole’s concurring opinion illustrate, the admissibility of the victim impact evidence in a case of this type presents constitutional issues. I would adhere to our normal policy of not ruling upon constitutional questions unnecessarily. See, e.g., Rutherford v. Rutherford, 296 Md. 347 , 364 n. 6 (majority opinion), 366-367 (concurring opinion) 464 A.2d 228 (1983), and cases there cited. Conse *753 quently, I would refrain from expressing any opinion concerning the admissibility of the victim impact evidence at the prior sentencing proceeding.