contrary to The General County Assessment Law, the Third Class County Law provided that a party may appeal from any decision of an assessment board or court of common pleas as though it had been a party to the proceedings before such board or court, even though it was not such a party in fact. Thus, the school district that did not intervene in appeal before the Assessment Board was permitted to bring an appeal before the Commonwealth Court.
How later courts described this case
- contrary to The General County Assessment Law, the Third Class County Law provided that a party may appeal from any decision of an assessment board or court of common pleas as though it had been a party to the proceedings before such board or court, even though it was not such a party in fact. Thus, the school district that did not intervene in appeal before the Assessment Board was permitted to bring an appeal before the Commonwealth Court.
- except where Third Class County Assessment Law, Act of June 26, 1931, P.L. 1379, as amended, 72 P.S. §§ 5342-5350k, repealed by Act of October 27, 2010, P.L. 895, now 53 Pa.C.S. §§ 8801-8868, is inconsistent with the provisions of the General County Assessment Law, both laws apply
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
KALISH, Senior Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
*414 As a result of negotiations, the Board and the taxpayer entered into a stipulation fixing the assessed value of the property involved, which the trial court accepted.
The trial court should be affirmed if it has not made an error of law. Wynne, Inc. Tax Assessment Case, 434 Pa. 59 , 253 A.2d 632 (1969). I believe that the trial court did err.
In Pittsburgh Miracle Mile Town & Country Shopping Center Inc. v. Board of Property Assessment, 417 Pa. 243 , 209 A.2d 394 (1965), the court indicated that a stipulation as to fair market value of land is merely an evidentiary expedient and does not alter the court’s obligation to pass upon and determine the correctness of the property assessment. Such a stipulation, in effect, achieves only the same evidentiary result as though the taxpayer offered no evidence to challenge or overcome the prima-facie validity of the Board’s assessment. In other words, just as the taxing authority cannot rely solely on its assessment record in the face of countervailing evidence, it should not be permitted to rely on a stipulation. A stipulation designed to restrict the court’s function cannot change the scope of the court’s obligation on review.
Article IX, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides that all taxes must be uniform on the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax. Thus, the uniformity provision of the Constitution of Pennsylvania requires that taxes must be applied uniformly upon similar kinds of property and with substantial equality of the tax burden to all members of the same class. 1 Brooks Building Tax Assessment Case, 391 Pa. 94 , 137 A.2d 273 (1958).
In determining whether the constitutional provision of uniformity has been complied with, all properties are comparable in construing the appropriate ratio of assessed *415 value to market value. In proving what is the ratio the property owners, taxing authority, and the courts may rely on relevant evidence. Deitch Co. v. Board of Property Assessment, 417 Pa. 213 , 209 A.2d 397 (1965).
If, by stipulation, a taxpayer is permitted to pay less than his fair share, there is an injustice to the remaining taxpayers. The proceedings in the trial court are de novo, and the determination of fair market value must ultimately be made on the basis of competent testimony as to the worth of the property in the market at a fair sale. Deitch.
Fair market value, which is the basis of real estate tax assessments, embodies a willing buyer, willing seller concept, in the open market, at arms length—a normal sale, a fair sale. To rely on a stipulation as to fair market value, even with the approval of the court, is an improper reliance on irrelevant testimony. Deitch.
. In McKnight Shopping Center v. Board of Property Assessment, 417 Pa. 234 , 209 A.2d 389 (1965), in a footnote, the court indicated that even absent the uniformity constitutional clause in the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution *415 would protect taxpayers from discrimination in violation of their right to equal protection.