Opinion

Wagner v. National Indemnity Co.

  • 492 Pa. 154
  • 422 A.2d 1061
  • 1980 Pa. LEXIS 822
Court
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Sep 22, 1980
Status
Published
Author
Nix
On the bench
Eagen, O'Brien, Roberts, Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, Kauffman
Cited by
56 cases

the Supreme Court noting that an employer or insurance carrier is “precluded from asserting” immunity for fringe benefits because of their “independent contractual vitality”

How later courts described this case

  • the Supreme Court noting that an employer or insurance carrier is “precluded from asserting” immunity for fringe benefits because of their “independent contractual vitality”
  • exclusiveness of Workers’ Compensation Act barred employee’s claim for no-fault benefits against employer’s insurer “for an insurer provides coverage for an employer’s possible liability and has no independent basis for liability on its own part”
  • held an employe may not recover no-fault benefits through his employer’s no-fault policy.
  • held an employe may not recover no-fault benefits under his employer’s no-fault policy.

Written by the judges who cited it.

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by Bulgin v. Pennsylvania Assigned Claims Plan, 21 Pa. D. & C.3d 15 (1981)

    As we did with respect to the estate’s claim, we reject any argument that the individual claimant is limited to workmen’s compensation by reason of the decision in Wagner v. National Indemnity Co., 492 Pa. 154, 422 A. 2d 1061 (1980).
    Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Cumberland CountySep 21, 1981Read it

The opinion

NIX, Justice,

concurring.

I am in complete accord with the reasoning of the majority opinion, and join therein. I write this concurring state *169 ment in response to the dissent authored by Mr. Justice Kauffman. I believe that the position in the dissent, which has been well articulated, has a basic flaw which should be identified.

Mr. Justice Kauffman asserts, “liability of the employer is not the issue here.” P. 1070. No-fault coverage, although statutorily mandated, is no more than a contract of indemnity. The error of the dissent is that it has limited the concept of liability to that which arises from the negligent conduct of the insured. Liability also embraces obligations imposed by law, even though they are not associated with fault. The provision of the policy of insurance in question was intended to cover the liability of Shreiner Trucking Company created under the Pennsylvania No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act. 1

Any suggestion of a third party donee beneficiary contract is unrelated to the realities of the situation and establishes the type of fiction that is antagonistic to realistic dispute resolutions. It is not the role of the judiciary to define what in their judgment should be, but rather to meet our responsibility of clarifying that which the legislature intended. The merits of that legislative judgment must be left for the scrutiny of the public.

. No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, Act of July 19, 1974, P.L. 489, No. 176, Art. 1, § 102; 40 P.S. § 1009.102 (Supp. 1979-80).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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