concluding that “the validity of the exercise of senatorial courtesy . . . does not implicate the privilege accorded to legislators under the [New Jersey Constitution’s] Speech and Debate Clause.”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that “the validity of the exercise of senatorial courtesy . . . does not implicate the privilege accorded to legislators under the [New Jersey Constitution’s] Speech and Debate Clause.”
- affirming, by an equally divided court, dismissal of complaint challenging exercise of “senatorial courtesy,” defining practice as “an unwritten, informal, and unofficial procedure allowing a single senator who resides in or represents any portion of the county in which a nominee is domiciled to veto the appointment without further action by the Senate[,]” and explaining that “[t]his case *371 implicates three principles that define the role of the judiciary in a democracy: judicial review, judicial restraint, and judicial independence”
- recognizing it is firmly established that controversies which have become moot or academic prior to judicial resolution ordinarily will be dismissed
- explaining that an appellate court "normally will not entertain cases when a controversy no longer exists"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
PER CURIAM.
The judgment of the Superior Court, Chancery Division, Mercer County, is affirmed. The members of the Court being equally divided on the grounds for affirmance, the Court has filed no majority opinion.