The opinion
SILVESTRI, Senior Judge,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that although Schwarz’s testimony supports the referee’s finding that Schwarz was aware of her work related injury for nearly ten years, yet failed to notify Employer, the matter should, nonetheless, be remanded for findings as to whether Schwarz suffered daily aggravation of her condition and, therefore, timely gave notice as each day she worked constituted a “new injury.” As I do not agree with the majority that our decision in Mancini’s Bakery v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Leone), 155 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 641, 625 A.2d 1308 (1993) applies to this matter, I would simply reverse the Board’s determination and reinstate the referee’s decision and order finding that Schwarz failed to provide Employer timely notice of her work-related condition as required by Section 311 of the Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act. 1 Accordingly, I dissent.
Section 311 clearly specifies as follows:
Unless the employer shall have knowledge of the occurrence of the injury, or unless the employe or someone in his behalf, or some of the dependents or someone in their behalf, shall give notice thereof to the employer within twenty-one days after the injury, no compensation shall be due until such notice be given, and, unless such notice be given within one hundred and twenty days after the occur *122 rence of the injury, no compensation shall be allowed. However, in cases of injury resulting from ionizing radiation or any other cause in which the nature of the injury or its relationship to the employment is not known to the employe, the time for giving notice shall not begin to run until the employe knows, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, of the existence of the injury and its possible relationship to his employment. (Emphasis added).
The language of Section 311 is clear that when the relationship of the injury to the employment is not known to the employee, the 120-day notification period does not begin to run until the employee either knows or should know of such relationship. See E.J.T. Construction, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Larusso), 47 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 492, 408 A.2d 226 (1979). Once an employee has knowledge or should have knowledge of the relation of the injury to ones employment, the 120-day period commences. See Bolitch v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Volkswagon of America, Inc.), 132 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 110, 572 A.2d 39 , petition for allowance of appeal denied, 526 Pa. 639 , 584 A.2d 321 (1990).
In Bolitch , cited by the majority, this Court, in reviewing a claimant’s testimony who argued that she notified her employer in a timely fashion of her work related injury, stated the following:
A fair reading of the claimant’s testimony establishes that claimant’s back pain began at work on May 1, 1986, that the back pain continued for some period of time and that her work increased her pain. Under these facts, it is fairly obvious that the claimant should have known as of the date of her injury that her injury was work related. Consequently, we believe there is substantial evidence to support the referee’s finding that the claimant knew of the nature of her injury and that it was work related on May 1, 1986. (Emphasis added).
Bolitch , 132 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 116, 572 A.2d at 43 .
Here, there is no question that Schwarz admitted, and the referee found, that she was aware of the relation of her injury *123 to her employment ten years prior to her notifying Employer of said relationship. As set forth by the majority, Schwarz testified as follows:
Q. When did you first start experiencing pain with your feet?
A. Oh, about fifteen years ago, I would say.
Q. And did you seek any kind of treatment for that?
A. Yes, within, oh probably the last ten years. The pain got so severe, I started to go to a podiatrist.
Q. In (sic) what affect did your job have on your feet?
A. Well, it just made — when I went to work, when I had to wear heels, when I had to stand for prolonged periods of time, it caused excruciating pain, and I had to keep going to the doctor for some kind of treatment.
Q. When you were off the job, was that pain alleviated at all?
A. Oh, yes. I wasn’t wearing heels. I was wearing Reeboks or something to cushion my feet.
Q. Reeboks are what?
A. Tennis shoes.
Q. So when you weren’t wearing high heels as part of your uniform, the pain was alleviated?
A. A lot of it, most of it, yes.
(R.R. 6-7).
Q. What seemed to aggravate the condition? Anything to you seem to aggravate the condition?
A. Yes, heels, standing long periods of time in heels. Q. So you were suffering from this condition for at least ten years?
A. Well, more than ten years. I would say 15, but before I went to the doctor.
Q. And in your opinion, it was the job that was causing and aggravating the condition?
A. Yes.
(R.R. 11-12).
*124 There is no dispute, based upon Schwarz’s testimony, that Schwarz had knowledge of the relation of her injury to her work for “more than ten years” prior to notifying Employer of said condition and that she failed to comply with the notice mandate set forth at Section 311 of the Act. I would reverse the Board’s order and reinstate the order of the referee.
. Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. § 631.