holding the second prong may be met by showing "that the parent is unable to provide a safe and stable home for the child and that the delay in securing permanency continues or adds to the child's harm," or "that the child will suffer substantially from a lack of stability and a permanent placement and from the disruption of her bond with foster parents"
How later courts described this case
- holding the second prong may be met by showing "that the parent is unable to provide a safe and stable home for the child and that the delay in securing permanency continues or adds to the child's harm," or "that the child will suffer substantially from a lack of stability and a permanent placement and from the disruption of her bond with foster parents"
- explaining that a determination of whether "a child will suffer a greater harm from the termination of ties with [his] natural parents than from the permanent disruption of [his] relationship with foster parents" "'necessarily requires expert inquiry specifically directed to the strength of each relationship'" (quoting J.C., 129 N.J. at 25 )
- stating that "[t]he balance between parental rights and the State's interest in the welfare of children is achieved through the bests interests of the child standard," as noted in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15(c) and elaborated upon in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)
- holding the four prongs of the best interests test "are not discrete and separate; they relate to and overlap with one another to provide a comprehensive standard that A-1540-21 28 identifies a child's best interests"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
O’HERN, J.,
concurring.
I concur in the judgment of the Court, but for different reasons. I agree that an injury inflicted on an unborn child by its mother may be considered as part of the harm suffered by a child under the first prong of the four-part test, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), neces *364 sary to terminate parental rights. I disagree that in and of itself, giving birth to a drug-dependent child qualitatively establishes the first prong of the test. (Recall the cases of mothers who leave their children in locked cars at malls. A single incident of neglect on the part of a parent is not enough normally to terminate parental rights.) Rather, I agree with the Appellate Division that the trial court’s findings were incomplete and inadequate to sustain a judgment terminating parental rights. 308 N.J.Super. 432, 453 , 706 A.2d 226 (1998). Except for perhaps placing too much emphasis on the possibility of long-term foster care, the Appellate Division conscientiously applied the four-part test for the termination of parental rights. 1 After thorough review, the court properly remanded the matter for further consideration.
In hindsight, we now have the benefit of the remand ordered by the Appellate Division. The supplemental psychological evaluation reports, submitted October 10, 1998, convincingly establish that “[a] case goal of reunification of [K.H.O.] with [her biological mother B.S.] is not viable or appropriate to consider---[K.H.O.] should be adopted by her foster parents.” B.S. is currently in an out-patient drug rehabilitation program in Georgia. Although the results of her most recent drug tests indicate that she is negative for both opiates and ethanol, B.S. acknowledges that she would not be able to continue her progress in New Jersey. Although she has now apparently changed her position, B.S. conveyed to the trial court and the psychologist that she is prepared to surrender her parental rights; her only hesitation is based on the concern that there will be no guarantee that she will be permitted future contact with K.H.O. The record clearly indicates that B.S. is honest enough to realize that she cannot realistically perform her parental obligations within the time frame of her child’s needs. All that she asks is that she be allowed continued visitation. We should be able to accommodate her plea to play a part in her child’s life. See In re Adoption of *365 Child by D.M.H., 135 N.J. 473 , 641 A.2d 235 , cert. denied sub nom. Hollingshead v. Hoxworth, 513 U.S. 967 , 115 S.Ct. 433 , 130 L.Ed.2d 345 (1994) (explaining that “[notwithstanding the absence of legislation, voluntary and informal open-adoption arrangements do exist and, for some families, such arrangements may balance the needs of biological and adoptive parents.”) (citation omitted).
For reversal and reinstatement — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN and COLEMAN — -7.
Opposed — None.
We note thati. 1999, c. 53, § 30 (eff.Mar. 31, 1999) amended N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1 placing an emphasis on permanent placement.