Opinion

Jenkins v. Jenkins

  • 112 Md. App. 390
  • 685 A.2d 817
  • 1996 Md. App. LEXIS 164
Court
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
Filed
Dec 2, 1996
Status
Published
Author
Alpert
On the bench
Harrell and Eyler, Jj., and Paul E. Alpert, Judge (Retired), Specially Assigned
Cited by
29 cases

Superseded by statute, as recognized in Bussell v. Bussell

holding that that Court did not have jurisdiction over appeal pursuant to Rule 8-602(e) where appellant noted appeal prematurely because the trial court erroneously ordered a final judgment when it did not have such discretion under Rule 2-602

How later courts described this case

  • holding that that Court did not have jurisdiction over appeal pursuant to Rule 8-602(e) where appellant noted appeal prematurely because the trial court erroneously ordered a final judgment when it did not have such discretion under Rule 2-602
  • where a circuit court intends that a QDRO or Constituted Pension 20 Order be integral to the final judgment, the judgment is not appealable until the circuit court enters the QDRO
  • `Premature notices of appeal are generally of no force and effect. . . . They have no effect because premature appeals are a jurisdictional defect. . . . We may not confer appellate jurisdiction on our own initiative.'
  • `Premature notices of appeal are generally of no force and *Page 1063 effect. . . . They have no effect because premature appeals are a jurisdictional defect. . . . We may not confer appellate jurisdiction on our own initiative.'

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

  • Superseded by statute, as recognized in Bussell v. Bussell

    112 Md.App. 390, 408, 685 A.2d 817 (1996), superseded by rule as stated in Bussell v. Bussell, 194 Md.App. 137, 152-54, 3 A.3d 480 (2010).
    Court of Special Appeals of MarylandSep 1, 2010by statutemedium confidenceRead it

The opinion

PAUL E. ALPERT, Judge,

Specially Assigned, dissenting.

I dissent. No doubt a strict and literal reading of Rule 8-602(d) would be consistent with the majority’s theory of this case. I believe, however, that we must look to the rule’s intent, i.e., to save premature appeals.' The trial judge in his opinion concluded “that the division was to be one-half of the marital portion of the pension. Counsel shall prepare an appropriate declaratory judgment____” The declaratory judgment does nothing more than reflect and implement the trial judge’s decision. The majority is absolutely correct when they state, “The trend, in Maryland and nationally, is to remove the technical hurdles that sometimes frustrate access to the courts.” Op. at 826. I would continue that trend.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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