explaining that “Persinger is inapposite because [the defendant] was advised . . . that the sentences could (and likely would) be consecutive.”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “Persinger is inapposite because [the defendant] was advised . . . that the sentences could (and likely would) be consecutive.”
- stating “[tjestimony by appellant and his counsel at the PCRA hearing may, if sufficiently specific, be considered in reviewing all the circumstances surrounding the plea”
- although guilty plea colloquy did not inform defendant of possibility of consecutive sentences, totality of circumstances surrounding the plea demonstrated that defendant fully understood nature and consequences of his plea; defendant signed written guilty plea acknowledging that he discussed possible range of sentences with counsel, and counsel testified that he advised defendant of likelihood of consecutive sentences
- holding appellant’s guilty plea valid when he did so -5- J-S45037-22 in hope of a more lenient sentence
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CAVANAUGH, Judge,
dissenting.
I agree that the majority disposition represents a perfectly reasonable result in response to appellant Yager’s opportunistic attempt to set aside his 1991 guilty plea. I disagree with the methodology whereby our court undertakes to modify a *443 clearly enunciated authority established by our supreme court. As the majority readily concedes, the guilty plea colloquy in this case was deficient in that Yager was not advised of the potential for consecutive sentences for multiple convictions. In Commonwealth v. Persinger, 532 Pa. 317 , 615 A.2d 1305 (1992), a unanimous supreme court 1 announced:
A defendant obviously cannot be expected to plead intelligently without understanding the consequences of his plea. In order to understand the consequences of his plea it is clear that a defendant must be informed of the maximum punishment that might be imposed for his conduct. Commonwealth v. Kulp [ 476 Pa. 358 , 382 A.2d 1209 (1978)1 supra. To hold that the term “maximum” does not include the total possible aggregate sentence is clearly incorrect. And to hold that a plea was intelligently and understandingly entered where a defendant was not informed that consecutive sentences could be imposed upon his multiple convictions is equally incorrect.
532 Pa. 317, 323 , 615 A.2d 1305, 1308 .
Pennsylvania has sought to give credibility to guilty plea procedures and has therefore adopted formulistic requirements for a valid plea. Pa.R.Crim.P. 319 elaborates the requirements of a valid plea and Persinger declaratively stated that the possible aggregate sentence must be included in the colloquy. (“We find that the absence of this inquiry from the transcript renders the colloquy defective” [ 615 A.2d at 1308 ]). In order to avoid the harsh result required by the defective colloquy in this case, the majority is impelled to adopt a new “totality of circumstances” standard and to rely on trial counsel’s hypothetical reconstruction of his discussions with his client. (“ I would have indicated ... ”) (“I most likely would have indicated ... ”).
Our Supreme Court must be assumed to be aware of the consequences of its decisions. It is our duty to follow clear authority (or perhaps in a case such as this, voice disagreement with the application of that authority) but in any event *444 precedent must be followed. 2 I would reverse and remand for trial.
. One justice concurred in the result.
. See, McMahon v. Shea, 441 Pa.Super. 304 , 657 A.2d 938 (1995) allocatur granted, 544 Pa. 611 , 674 A.2d 1074 , Cavanaugh, J., dissent.