The opinion
*924 SCHWELB, Senior Judge,
concurring in the judgment:
I agree with my colleagues in the majority that the Board is not authorized to terminate the voluntary agreement without first making the findings specified in subsections (A) and (B) of D.C.Code § 25-446(d)(4), as well as the finding in subsection (C). Accordingly, I concur in the reversal of the Board’s order. I write separately, however, because I find the issue substantially more difficult than my colleagues do.
In its opinion, the majority refers repeatedly to the “plain language” and the “plain meaning” of the statute, and relies on decisions in which the statutory language was altogether unambiguous. My colleagues even assert, see maj. op., ante, at 923 n. 4, that the meaning of the statute before us is so plain that resort to legislative history would be inappropriate. I cannot agree with this assessment. 5 Indeed, “even when a statute appears to be clear on its face, a review of the legislative history may reveal a latent ambiguity which the court must resolve.” Baghini v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 525 A.2d 1027, 1029 (D.C.1987) (citing Peoples Drug Stores, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 754 (D.C.1983) (en banc)). Here, in my view, the ambiguity is clear, not latent.
In its brief in this court, the Board, after quoting § 25-446(d), see maj. op., ante, at pp. 918-19, argues, in pertinent part, as follows:
The Board’s resolution of [the issue] was at minimum reasonable. The Council’s choice to refer to amendments but not termination in subsections (A) and (B) should be presumed deliberate: “Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.” See, e.g., Howard Univ. Hosp. v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 994 A.2d 375, 377-78 (D.C.2010). Although the resulting interpretation is in tension with the introductory clause’s use of the word “each,” a reasonable interpretation of the statute as a whole is that the Council intended to require the Board to make “each of the following findings” under the succeeding subsections to the extent those subsections required findings.
It is not at all “clear” or “obvious” to me that this analysis of the provisions of § 25-446(d)(4) is erroneous. Rather, it strikes me as being one of two plausible (as distinguished from plainly correct) interpretations of the statute, and it takes into consideration the fact that while subsection (C) addresses “amendment or termination” of a voluntary agreement, subsections (A) and (B) deal with “amendment” only. In my opinion, therefore, the statutory language is not as “plain” or as “clear” as the majority (or, indeed, the Board in its decision) says it is. Reasonable people could read it either way.
We accord “considerable deference” to the Board’s interpretation of statutes it is charged with administering. 800 Water St., Inc. v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 992 A.2d 1272, 1274 (D.C.2010). At first blush, one might be tempted, in light of what I perceive to be two plausible constructions, to accord such deference here. But as the Board acknowledges in its brief:
In three prior decisions, the Board admittedly has stated that a licensee must satisfy all three criteria in D.C.Code § 25-446(d)(4) to terminate a voluntary agreement. See In the Matter of NHV Corporation, Inc.; t/a Haydee’s Restaurant, Case No. 10515-07/065P, Order *925 No.2008-189; In the Matter of Jamie T. Carrillo t/a Don Jaime’s Restaurant, Case No. 10579-07/53P, Order No.2008-190; In the Matter of Don Juan Restaurant, Inc. t/a Don Juan Restaurant & Carryout, Case No. 21278-07/042P, Order No.2008-233. It is also true that the Board did not mention these decisions in the decision at issue in this appeal.
(Footnote omitted.) We have repeatedly-held that “[t]he deference which courts owe to agency interpretation of statutes which they administer is, of course, at its zenith where the administrative construction has been consistent and of long standing, and plummets substantially when those attributes are lacking.” Tenants of 738 Longfellow St., N.W. v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm’n, 575 A.2d 1205, 1213 (D.C.1990) (emphasis added); accord, Superior Beverages, Inc. v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 567 A.2d 1319, 1325 (D.C.1989). Under these circumstances, and mindful of the phrase “plummets substantially,” I am not prepared to accord the Board’s interpretation dispositive weight here.
That being said, I think that, all things considered, the petitioners have the better of the argument. The Board acknowledges, as I have noted, that its construction of the statute is “in tension with the introductory clause’s use of the word ‘each.’ ” If we were to adopt the Board’s interpretation, the party seeking termination would not be required to present evidence to support each of the three findings, apparently contemplated in the introductory clause. While not dispositive, the use of the word “each” is the most significant indication in the text of the legislature’s intent. Further, for the reasons stated by the majority, it is counter-intuitive and arguably unfair 6 for the parties to an agreement to be entitled to notice, and to an opportunity to negotiate, when the lesser relief of an amendment is at issue, but not when the more drastic remedy of termination is sought. Indeed, except for the court’s insistence that the statute is clear and unambiguous — and this is an important proviso — I generally agree with the majority’s principal conclusions. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment.
. By contrast, in its decision in this case, the Board asserts that its contrary interpretation is supported by the plain language of the statute. Plainness, like beauty, is apparently in the eye of the beholder.
. Any injustice is tempered, however, by the fact that if the Board grants the request to terminate the agreement, the petitioners would have the right to protest and oppose the renewal of the license upon its termination.