applying § 305 to offense under the Liquor Code, 47 P.S. § 4—493
How later courts described this case
- applying § 305 to offense under the Liquor Code, 47 P.S. § 4—493
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
Hoffman, J.:
While I agree entirely with the legal analysis of the Majority Opinion, I dissent because I believe that the stipulated facts do not support the conclusion reached by the Majority.
The appellants were charged with violations of the Liquor Code for which absolute liability is imposed, and thus are normally summary offenses. See 18 Pa.C.S. §305 (b) (1). If the Commonwealth can prove, however, *147 that the defendant was negligent with respect to one or more of the material elements of the offense, the defendant is properly charged with and convicted of a higher crime as classified by §106 of the Crimes Code. See 18 Pa.C.S. §305 (b)(2). In the instant case, the Majority states that appellants’ agents were negligent in not requesting identification of the patrons and in not requesting the identification statement or card required by §495 (c) of the Liquor Code. This evidence, however, only goes to prove the negligence of the agents; it has no relevance to the issue of whether the appellants themselves were negligent. As the Majority correctly notes, the negligence of the agents is imputed to the appellants under the theory of absolute liability. Thus, the appellants would properly be convicted of summary offenses.
The Majority goes on to state “ [t]here is no evidence that the appellants instructed, or required their agents, servants or employees to ask for proper identification or to procure the statement from the minors as to their ages.” The Majority, holds, however, that there was “ample evidence of negligence” which warranted appellants’ conviction of a misdemeanor. I emphatically disagree. Apparently, the Majority is inferring that because the employees failed to demand identification, the appellants failed to instruct their employees to do so. It seems to me, however, that a person with a valuable license would seek to insure that his agents would not do anything which might jeopardize the continued availability of the license. Thus, I believe that there is no inference which can be drawn from the stipulated facts which warrants a finding of negligence. In any event, the Commonwealth must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. I fail to see how the fact that the bartender failed to ask for identification is proof beyond a reasonable doubt of culpable conduct on the part of appellants.