The opinion
EPSTEIN, J.
I concur in the judgment. I write separately because I do not believe that it is necessary or appropriate in this case for the court to attempt a list of factors the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) should *1073 consider in reaching a future determination about what are reasonable fees. Language in the decision appears to do that. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 1071.) I am particularly concerned about some of the factors in this list, such as “other aspects of the economics of the medical provider’s practice that are relevant” (my italics), which are open ended and may be subject to an expansive reading.
The WCAB has discretion in determining whether, and to what degree, fees in excess of the schedule are reasonable. It may, if it wishes, exercise its rule-making authority in this area. (Lab. Code, § 5307; see State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 43, 53 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 153 ].) But a decision or a rule that disallows any fee over the schedule, unless justified by extraordinary circumstances related to exigencies of the treatment, cannot be reconciled with the reasonable fee provision of Labor Code section 5307.1.
That is what the board has done in this case, and that is the reason that I agree that its decisions in the matters before us must be annulled.
A petition for a rehearing was denied April 16, 1992, and respondents’ petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied May 28, 1992.