stating that “issues of PCRA counsel effectiveness must be raised in a serial PCRA petition or in response to a notice of dismissal before the PCRA court” and holding that “absent recognition of a constitutional right to effective collateral review counsel, claims of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness cannot be raised for the first time after a notice of appeal has been taken from the underlying PCRA matter”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “issues of PCRA counsel effectiveness must be raised in a serial PCRA petition or in response to a notice of dismissal before the PCRA court” and holding that “absent recognition of a constitutional right to effective collateral review counsel, claims of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness cannot be raised for the first time after a notice of appeal has been taken from the underlying PCRA matter”
- holding that “absent recognition of a constitutional right to effective collateral review counsel, claims of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness cannot be raised for the first time after a notice of appeal has been taken from the underlying PCRA matter.”
- stating that claims of ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel raised in appellant’s Rule 1925(b) concise statement, but not in the PCRA petition or in response to a notice of dismissal, are not properly preserved on appeal
- stating that “when counsel files a Turner/Finley no-merit letter to the PCRA court, a petitioner must allege any claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel in a response to the court’s notice of intent to dismiss.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CONCURRING OPINION BY
COLVILLE, J.:
For the reasons that follow, I concur with the Majority’s decision to affirm the order denying Appellant’s PCRA petition.
At Appellant’s jury waiver colloquy, the Commonwealth misrepresented that, for his charge of robbery, Appellant faced a maximum sentence of twenty years in prison if he would be convicted. In fact, he faced a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years if he would be convicted. Appellant first claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to this misrepresentation. Appellant argues that this ineffectiveness rendered his jury waiver involuntary.
In order for Appellant to be eligible for relief based upon his claim that he involuntarily waived his right to a jury, he ultimately was required to prove that, in waiving this right, he relied on the incorrect recitation of his sentence. See Commonwealth v. Houck, 596 Pa. 683 , 948 A.2d 780, 788-89 (2008) (“[T]he voluntariness of a jury waiver can be undermined where the defendant is informed of a range of potential sentences at a jury waiver colloquy that is less than the sentence eventually imposed.... [I]f a defendant seeks to invalidate an otherwise valid jury waiver based on a trial court’s recitation of his or her potential sentence, the defendant should be required to demonstrate that his or her understanding of the length of the potential sentence was a material factor in making the decision to waive a jury trial.... We believe, on balance, that the most appropriate rule is one requiring defendants to show reliance on a recitation of a sentence to qualify for relief.”). In my view, Appellant is due no relief because he failed to offer any evidence which demonstrates that he relied on the misrepresentation of his sentence in deciding to waive his right to a jury trial.
Under his second issue, Appellant claims that PCRA counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. I agree with the Majority insomuch as it concludes that the Supreme Court apparently has determined that such claims cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.