holding that testimony about defendant’s performance on the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, a roadside sobriety test, by a state trooper who had not been qualified as an expert, constituted expert testimony subject to the strictures of Maryland Rule 5-702
How later courts described this case
- holding that testimony about defendant’s performance on the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, a roadside sobriety test, by a state trooper who had not been qualified as an expert, constituted expert testimony subject to the strictures of Maryland Rule 5-702
- explaining why the court was unable to conclude that erroneously admitted HGN testimony in no way influenced the jury‟s DUI guilty verdict
- holding that testimony concerning a scientific test fell under Maryland Rule 5-702
- requiring witness testifying about facts observed to be qualified as an expert if observations required specialized knowledge
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Payne & Bond, 440 Md. 680 (2014)
In the present case the State asserts that Ragland and Blackwell are distinguishable from the present case because Detective Edwards did not render an opinion as to the location of Payne’s and Bond’s cell phones and that he merely read Sprint Nextel’s business records and followed its directions in interpreting the data.
The opinion
Dissenting Opinion,
MURPHY, J.
I agree with the majority and the Court of Special Appeals that “testimony about the HGN test constituted expert testimony,” and “is admissible in evidence pursuant to Md. Rule 5-702.” I do not agree, however, that the Circuit Court admitted the testimony about Respondent’s performance on the HGN test “without first making a preliminary legal determination that [Trooper] Linger was qualified to testify as an expert witness.”
The record shows that the Circuit Court told the prosecutor that, “[i]f you are going to use the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, you must lay a foundation that the witness is qualified to administer it.” The record also shows that the foundational requirements had been satisfied before the Circuit Court stated, “go ahead” to the prosecutor, and overruled the objection to Trooper Linger’s testimony.
It is of no consequence that the Circuit Court did not expressly state that it found Trooper Linger to be an “expert,” because many lawyers and judges strongly believe that it is the better practice for the trial judge to avoid using that term in the presence of the jury. In the case at bar, the Circuit Court in essence stated to the prosecutor, “you may proceed [to present the expert testimony].” I am persuaded that this ruling was neither erroneous nor an unfairly prejudicial abuse *700 of discretion. I would therefore affirm the judgment of conviction.