The opinion
BELL, C.J., GREENE and MURPHY, J J.,
Dissent.
Dissenting Opinion by GREENE, Judge, which BELL, C.J., Joins.
In this case, the State failed to show either that the police continued to use the surveillance location at issue or that any individuals needed protection in the event that the surveillance location was disclosed. Thus, there was no showing that the State had a legitimate interest in preventing disclosure and no justification for applying a balancing test or restricting Church’s right of cross-examination in this case. Therefore, although I agree with the majority that the trial court erred in refusing to allow Church to cross-examine Officer Kintop about the precise location of his observations, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that a limited remand is the proper *674 remedy in this case. See Church v. State, 408 Md. 650, 672-73 , 971 A.2d 280, 293 (2009). In my view, Church is entitled to the benefit of a new trial. The appropriate mandate is to reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, with directions to remand the case to the Circuit Court for purposes of a new trial.
In response to the State’s motion in limine, the trial judge ruled promptly on the matter on the day of trial, but prior to jury selection. The judge granted the State’s motion for nondisclosure, in part, pointing out that the court’s ruling was directed to those questions that defense counsel might ask during cross-examination of Officer Kintop. During the trial, defense counsel made it clear that he was tailoring his cross-examination of Officer Kintop so as not to violate the trial judge’s order. Church v. State, 408 Md. 650, 656-57 , 971 A.2d 280,283-84 (2009). Here, the majority, instead of focusing on the chilling effects of the trial judge’s ruling on Church’s right to effective cross-examination, focuses on the State’s burden of production and the need for the trial judge to have engaged in the proper balancing test. Id. at 672-73 , 971 A.2d at 292-93 . In essence, the majority’s discussion focuses more on giving the State another chance to get it right. In reaching the conclusion that a limited remand is appropriate, the majority assumes that the State will pursue the same tactics on remand that it employed in prosecuting Church the first time. That course of action, however, is not cast in stone. The State is free to elect, on remand, either to make the same motion to prevent disclosure of Officer Kintop’s observation post or to not call Officer Kintop as a witness in its case-in-chief. In following the latter course of action, Officer Kintop’s surveillance location would not necessarily become an issue in the State’s case. Church’s fundamental right to a fair trial is paramount, in my view. Thus, the only way to ensure that' Church receives a fair trial and that we effectively remedy the violation of his constitutional right to confrontation and cross-examination is to grant him a new trial.
We have said that a limited remand “is neither an ‘antidote’ for the errors of the State or of counsel nor a method to *675 correct errors committed during the trial itself.” Southern v. State, 371 Md. 93, 104 , 807 A.2d 13, 19 (2002) (see cases cited therein); see also Md. Rule 8-604(d) (authorizing remand); Lipinski v. State, 333 Md. 582, 591 , 636 A.2d 994, 998 (1994) (noting that although Rule 8-604(d) “ ‘may be suitable to correct procedures subsidiary to the criminal trial, it can never be utilized to rectify prejudicial errors committed during the trial itself ” (quoting Gill v. State, 265 Md. 350, 357 , 289 A.2d 575, 579 (1972))); Jones v. State, 379 Md. 704, 726 , 843 A.2d 778, 791 (2004) (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (noting that “when the error giving rise to the issue to be addressed on limited remand is one that is integral to the proceedings in which it occurred, the appropriate mandate ... would be a remand for new trial”). In Southern we held that a limited remand for the purpose of taking additional evidence in a reopened suppression hearing in the same case was not proper because the State failed to meet its initial burden of proof to establish the constitutionality of the defendant’s detention. 371 Md. at 112 , 807 A.2d at 24 . We explained that to grant the limited remand would give the State “a ‘second bite at the apple’ in the same case,” rather than “permit [the] court to cure some judicial error that resulted in unfairness to a party.” Id.; see also Mitchell v. State, 337 Md. 509, 517 , 654 A.2d 1309, 1313 (1995) (pointing out that the real key to determining the propriety of the limited remand is “whether the error adversely affected the defendant’s right to a fair trial”).
Here, the State requested that the trial judge exclude in limine evidence concerning Officer Kintop’s exact surveillance location. Although the State failed to show it had any legitimate interest in protecting the particular surveillance location, the trial judge granted the State’s motion for non-disclosure. The effect of the court’s ruling unfairly restricted defense counsel’s cross-examination of Officer Kintop. That ruling denied Church the benefit of a fair trial.
Secondly, I disagree with the majority’s assertion that “ft]he rule of Southern does not apply here, because this case does not involve a suppression hearing.” Church v. State, 408 Md. 650, 673 , 971 A.2d 280, 293 (2009). In my view, a ruling on a *676 motion in limine is quite analogous to a ruling on a motion to suppress evidence. A motion in limine, like a motion to suppress evidence, is a request for a ruling on the admissibility of evidence before it is actually offered. Similar to the situation in Southern , the State, here, failed to meet its burden of establishing any grounds for Officer Kintop to refuse to disclose the location of his surveillance post. As in Southern , it would be unfair, in effect, to remand the case for the limited purpose of allowing the State to reopen the motion hearing to present additional evidence. Fairness dictates that Church receive a new trial. The trial judge’s ruling, which restricted Church’s cross-examination of Officer Kintop, constituted an error that adversely affected the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Therefore, consistent with our prior case law, and on the basis of the record before us, where the State wrongfully and with undue prejudice to the defense was allowed to withhold the officer’s surveillance location, the appropriate remedy is to remand for a new trial. We cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the improper restriction placed on Church’s right of cross-examination in no way influenced the jury’s verdict. See Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659 , 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976).
Therefore, I dissent. Chief Judge BELL authorizes me to state that he joins the views expressed in this dissent.
Dissenting Opinion by MURPHY, Judge.
Although I have no disagreement with the majority’s analysis of the “surveillance location privilege” issue, because nothing in the record shows that Petitioner’s trial counsel did not acquiesce in the in limine ruling at issue, I do not agree that this issue has been preserved for our review. In Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 33 , 542 A.2d 1258 (1988), this Court held that when a trial judge’s in limine ruling excludes a line of questions, whether that ruling is preserved for appellate review depends upon whether the ruling was intended by the judge to be a final ruling. Id. at 38 , 542 A.2d at 1260 . An in limine ruling that excludes a line of questions is not appeal-able unless the record shows that the trial court intended the *677 ruling to be the “final word on the matter.” Prout v. State, 311 Md. 348, 358 , 535 A.2d 445, 449-50 (1988).
Without doubt, the appropriate bounds of professionalism require that counsel question witnesses in a manner consistent with the trial court’s in limine, ruling. In the case at bar, however, immediately after making the ruling, the Circuit Court expressly stated that, “I think actually I’m going to have to just judge it as it comes up.” Under these circumstances, to preserve this issue for appellate review, defense counsel was required to do more than say, “Very well,” or “That’s fine,” when responding to the Circuit Court, and/or say, “I don’t want to know where your location was,” when cross examining the officer. I would hold that this appeal point was “lost” because at no point during the officer’s cross-examination did defense counsel request that the Circuit Court reconsider its in limine, ruling.