noting that the stopped suspects were attempting to drive off at an excessive speed, consistent with “actions typically taken by individuals seeking to secrete themselves while leaving a crime scene”
How later courts described this case
- noting that the stopped suspects were attempting to drive off at an excessive speed, consistent with “actions typically taken by individuals seeking to secrete themselves while leaving a crime scene”
- holding that evidence of proximity is sufficient to permit jury to infer convenient access
- "in full knowledge that [his code-fendant] was carrying the pistol, appellant knowingly and voluntarily continued his association with him”
- conviction for carrying a pistol without a license upheld based on constructive possession where testimony revealed that the pistol had been shown to defendant
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MACK, Associate Judge,
dissenting in part:
Although the majority embellishes, with innocuous details (i.e., dimly lit street, etc.), the trial court’s finding that the police officers’ stop of appellant and his companions was permissible under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), I can accept the finding.
I most emphatically disagree, however, with the majority’s ruling that appellant *400 was properly convicted of carrying a pistol without a license. Accepting as true the testimony of the government’s witness, Bolling, that appellant and the codefendant Lucas knew that Bolling was carrying a gun on his hip (disputed by appellant and Lucas), I do not think there was sufficient evidence of constructive possession to go to the jury. How can one reason that a loaded gun is “conveniently accessible” to a person charged with carrying the gun when that gun is in fact carried on another person’s hip? How can one reason that the first person has “dominion and control” over that gun either while the other person carries that gun or when the other person, during the minute of police apprehension, attempts to discard the gun? What was the proof of appellant’s involvement in the “concert of illegal activity?” Indeed what “concert of illegal activity” was there? In my view, a reasonable juror could not conclude guilt “without crossing the bounds of permissible inference and entering the forbidden territory of conjecture and speculation.” Curry v. United States, 520 A.2d 255, 266 (D.C.1987). The majority, has allowed the doctrine of constructive possession “to cast too wide a net.” Id. at 264 .