The opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
Mu. Justice Pomekoy:
I continue to adhere to my objection to the deplorable practice of reconstructing by oral testimony at a suppression hearing a search warrant which on its face is invalid. Such attempts to supply, ex post facto, the essential Fourth Amendment ingredient of probable *316 cause by police testimony as to what was stated orally to the issuing authority at some remote prior date are, in my judgment, violative of the federal constitution. See my dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Mill iken, 450 Pa. 310 , 300 A. 2d 78, 84 (1973). The fact that we have now by procedural rule 1 prospectively put an end to this practice is no answer to the constitutional challenge made by this appellant to this 1969 search warrant.
The product of the search in this case was the murder weapon. Notwithstanding the strong evidence of guilt shown by this record (including the confession and identification testimony), I am unable to conclude that the introduction into evidence of such an important exhibit as the revolver was constitutionally harmless error. I therefore believe a new trial should be ordered. For this reason I am obliged to dissent.
Mr. Justice Manderino joins in this dissenting opinion.
Rule 2003 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, adopted by this Court on March 28, 1973. ,