repudiating charitable immunity as "inconsistent with the principle that 'liability should fall upon the party best situated to adopt preventive measures and thereby reduce the likelihood of injury’ ”
How later courts described this case
- repudiating charitable immunity as "inconsistent with the principle that 'liability should fall upon the party best situated to adopt preventive measures and thereby reduce the likelihood of injury’ ”
- stating when rule offends against reason, courts not only possess inherent authority to repudiate rule, but are required to do so
- liability for negligence assures compensation for injury and “gives warning that justice and the law demand the exercise of care”
- discussing the growth of the charitable immunity doctrine in the United States
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Jones:
For over three-quarters of a century this Court has constantly adhered to the doctrine which rendered charitable institutions immune from tort liability. Today, by divided vote, this Court abolishes this doctrine.
It may well be that the time has come to reevaluate and reexamine the reasons which motivated the creation of this doctrine and to determine, under present day conditions, the justification, if any, for the continuance of the doctrine. However, although fully cognizant that this doctrine is “judge made” law created by judicial, not legislative, fiat, in my opinion, this doctrine has become part of the public policy of this Commonwealth, a public policy which, if it is to be changed, should be effected by legislative action. The abolition of the “charitable immunity” doctrine will affect adversely and seriously all 1 charitable institutions throughout the Commonwealth and the impact of such extinction is a matter of grave public concern. Under such circumstances, I believe that the legislature and not this Court should act in this area.
It is a matter of concern that from the majority opinion an implication arises that the doctrine is abolished only as to hospitals when sued by patients who paid for the hospital services. If the doctrine is to be abolished, reason and common sense dictate that the doctrine should be abolished as to all charitable institutions regardless of whether the service rendered by such institutions was paid for or not.