Seven Islands Land Co. v. Maine Land Use Regulation Commission

NICHOLS and WATHEN, Justices

(concurring).

While we agree with our colleagues in their disposition of the substantive issues, we write separately because it is our view that this action for judicial review should be dismissed for lack of standing in the Petitioner, Seven Islands Land Company. The gravamen of the claim asserted herein is an unconstitutional taking. It is not a claim to be asserted by a manager vicari *484 ously. The owners themselves should be in court. 1

We start with the fundamental principle that courts are instituted to afford relief to persons whose rights have been invaded, or are threatened with invasion, by a defendant’s act or conduct, or to give relief at the instance of such persons. 2 A court may appropriately refuse to entertain an action brought by one whose rights have not been invaded or infringed. 3 A party must have some interest in the subject matter of potential litigation to entitle him to maintain an action thereon. 4

In sum, the question of standing is generally resolved by determining whether the controversy touches upon the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests and whether the party invoking the court’s jurisdiction has a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. 5 As we declared a few months ago, “A party has standing to appeal a judgment only where the judgment adversely and directly affects that party’s property, pecuniary or personal rights.” 6 This Petitioner, we submit, cannot meet that test.

Standing is a prudential matter often involving the principle of judicial self-restraint by which the courts avoid interference with other branches of government. 7

The doctrine of standing insures that the court will have the benefit of truly adverse parties in resolving the controversy. True adverseness sharpens the presentation of issues upon which a court so largely depends for the illumination of difficult questions before it.

Perhaps not in the instant case, but in many cases, there are added benefits derived from the application of this doctrine, just as there is in the application of the real-party-in-interest rule, M.R.Civ.P. 17(a); it assures that the parties are before the court against whom the defendants may wish to assert counterclaims, and against whom the defendants may wish to have available in the future a defense of res judicata.

In the case at bar we must consider the question of standing as it relates to judicial review of administrative action. Here we find the essential principle codified in the statute governing such an appeal as this:

Persons aggrieved by final actions of the commission, including without limitation any final decision of the commission with respect to any application for approval or the adoption by the commission of any district boundary or amendment thereto, may appeal therefrom in accordance with Title 5, Chapter 375, subchap-ter VII. This right of appeal, with respect to any commission action to which *485 this right may apply, shall be in lieu of the rights provided under Title 5, section 8058, subsection 1. 12 M.R.S.A. § 689 (1980).

The question before us is whether or not Seven Islands Land Company is a person “aggrieved” by the final action of the Commission.

In the context of appeals from the decisions of other agencies we have had repeated occasions to declare that for a party to have standing to seek judicial review of an administrative order, the party must demonstrate a particularized injury from the order. Pride’s Corner Concerned Citizens Association v. Westbrook Board of Zoning Appeals, Me., 398 A.2d 415, 418 (1979); Matter of Lappie, Me., 377 A.2d 441, 443 (1977).

Seven Islands Land Company has failed on this record to demonstrate a particularized injury to it. 8 The Petitioner is not aggrieved.

Accordingly, we would prefer to decide the case on lack of standing. We would not reach the merits of the controversy.

. The Petitioner asserts no claim that it has sustained injury itself. Rather the Petitioner avers that it brings this action for judicial review as an ageat for some thirty-six owners whose names are spread in the caption to the petition but whose respective holdings are nowhere in this record identified or described. We cannot ascertain from the record which of these holdings are involved, and which are not involved, in each of the issues raised. If the Court were persuaded the Petitioner’s claim was meritorious, it could not determine from this record the extent to which each of the several owners was damaged. The Petitioner’s allegation that there had been an unconstitutional taking of the owners’ property is followed by the astonishing prayer that due compensation be paid, not to the several owners for their respective losses, but to the Petitioner.

. See generally, Nichols, “Standing to Sue: The Litigants’ Key to the Courthouse Door,” 9 Maine Bar Bulletin 1 (Jan. 1975).

. Huntington v. Savings Bank, 96 U.S. 388 , 24 L.Ed. 777 (1877).

. Bourque-Lanigan Post No. 5, The American Legion, v. Carey, 148 Me. 114, 117 , 90 A.2d 710, 712 (1952).

. The doctrine of “standing to sue” in the federal courts has its own unique significance, often requiring consideration of whether there is a justiciable controversy within the meaning of Article III, Section 2, of the United States Constitution. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 , 95 S.Ct. 2197 , 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975).

. Gaynor v. McEachem, Me., 437 A.2d 867, 871 (1981).

. Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc., v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 , 90 S.Ct. 827 , 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970).

. See generally State v. Board of County Commissioners of the County of Ravalli, 181 Mont. 177, 180 , 592 P.2d 945, 947 (1979) (firm of engineers hired to plat subdivisions lacked standing to seek a writ of mandamus to require approval or disapproval thereof); Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, 175 Conn. 483, 496-97 , 400 A.2d 726, 732 (1978) (association owning no real property lacks standing to represent members based on their property interests); Mueller v. Anderson, 60 Misc.2d 568 , 303 N.Y.S.2d 143, 144 (1969) (notwithstanding custom and practice of permitting neighborhood association to appear before administrative agency, the association was not a proper party to the judicial review).