concluding that there was "no inequity in the application of the [unfinished business] rule" when one attorney, who did not work on contingency matter after dissolution, testified that, before dissolution, "his work represented the firm's principal source of revenue and allowed [the departing partner] to concentrate on the as-yet unpaid" contingency matter
How later courts described this case
- concluding that there was "no inequity in the application of the [unfinished business] rule" when one attorney, who did not work on contingency matter after dissolution, testified that, before dissolution, "his work represented the firm's principal source of revenue and allowed [the departing partner] to concentrate on the as-yet unpaid" contingency matter
- noting that primary statutory criteria, like profit sharing, " ‘take[ ] on greater or lesser importance as an independent element of partnership depending on the extent to which there is other evidence supporting partnership' ”
- "[Plend-ing cases are uncompleted transactions requiring winding up after dissolution, and are therefore assets of the partnership subject to post-dissolution distribution."
- holding that “pending contingent fee cases are partnership property and, therefore, assets subject to distribution on dissolution”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Hogan Lovells US LLP v. Howrey LLP, 531 B.R. 814 (2015)
Including, for instance, that Beckman and Young are inapplicable outside the contingent fee context, that they have been superseded by RUPA, and that the entirety of the law firm defendants' profits constitute "reasonable compensation” under RUPA § 401(h).
Distinguished by Poeta v. Jaffe, 51 Pa. D. & C.4th 78 (2001)
Beckman, however, is distinguishable from this case.
The opinion
STEADMAN, Associate Judge:
I concur in the result. Although the indication is, in understatement, very strong that a partnership existed, 1 and although the motions judge may well have felt she was dealing with the matter pursuant to the posture presented by counsel for both parties, cf. Vessels v. District of Columbia, 531 A.2d 1016, 1019 (D.C.1987) (trial court may review record “in the context of the legal and factual issues as framed by the parties at summary judgment”); Cloverleaf Standardbred Owners Ass’n v. National Bank of Washington, 512 A.2d 299, 300 (D.C.1986) (“not the burden of the trial court to search the record, unaided by counsel, to determine whether summary *659 judgment is proper”), 2 1 cannot assert with confidence that the result of Part I of the majority opinion is an unwarranted application of our perhaps somewhat cramped doctrine governing summary judgment. Cf. Vessels, supra, 531 A.2d at 1019 (“[s]um-mary judgment is a valuable tool; it facilitates just, speedy and inexpensive determination” of lawsuits) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 , 106 S.Ct. 2548 , 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). 3 I also entirely agree with the discussion and result in Part III dealing with claimed evidentiary errors in the jury trial.
Beyond that, I believe we should refrain at this time from further review of the proceeding to date. The course that events will take upon remand is not entirely predictable. The full content and shape of a new record is uncertain. Any legal issues that may remain disputed 4 could be dealt with in the context of precise actual facts which squarely present the issues for determination. Resolution of the issues in Parts I and III seems to represent an effective disposition of this particular appeal, without venturing — perhaps entirely unnecessarily — into areas of functional dicta.
. Cf. Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule (DR) 2-102(C): "A lawyer shall not hold himself out as having a partnership with one or more other lawyers or professional corporations unless they are in fact partners.”
.In its order granting summary judgment, the trial court indicated that "both parties argued vigorously (and ably) that no actual facts which were material were in dispute, but rather that the disagreement between the parties centered on the legal conclusions to be drawn from facts which were already well established in the record.” The trial court went on to note: "Having argued vigorously for a decision on the basis of the [cross-motions for summary judgment], it is assumed that the losing party has waived any further arguments (either to this Court or the Court of Appeals) that existing disputes over material facts preclude disposition via summary judgment.”
. Of course, the issue whether a partnership existed inter se is not a conclusion in itself but simply a pigeon-holing means of determining an applicable legal principle governing Farmer's interest in the firm’s profits. However, even if in fact no true partnership existed, it is not immediately obvious to me that Farmer may not have some rights under an analogous theory-
. It appears that most, if not all, of such issues could be resolved on a subsequent appeal without the need of any further retrial.