rejecting “exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence” test and holding “whether the evidence is direct, circumstantial, or a combination of both,” prosecution satisfies its burden of proof if evidence, when viewed in light most favorable to State, is persuasive of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
How later courts described this case
- rejecting “exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence” test and holding “whether the evidence is direct, circumstantial, or a combination of both,” prosecution satisfies its burden of proof if evidence, when viewed in light most favorable to State, is persuasive of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
- explaining that Vermont would “now join” the jurisdictions that have abandoned the “reasonable hypothesis of innocence” standard
- adequate circumstantial evidence that defendant guilty of operating motor vehicle without owner’s consent where defendant seen walking slowly near van with keys left inside, man fitting general description of defendant seen driving van after it was reported missing, van found with all but ignition key inside, defendant subsequently found inside van attempting to start it, and ignition key found on floor after his apprehension by police
- review of sufficiency of evidence and of denial of motion for acquittal is governed by same standard: whether evidence, when viewed in light most favorable to State, is sufficient to convince reasonable trier of fact that defendant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*446 Billings, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur in the majority opinion as to the proper burden of proof that the State must bear in circumstantial evidence cases and agree that the measure of proof is beyond reasonable doubt in both direct and circumstantial evidence cases (Part II of the majority opinion).
I must, however, dissent from the result reached by the majority. In my opinion on the record here the State as a matter of law failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the operation of the motor vehicle by the defendant. Because this is an essential element in a charge of operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent, I would reverse the defendant’s conviction and enter a judgment of acquittal.