although single-judge order denying motion to quash would not ordinarily be reconsidered by en banc panel, importance of issue and interests of judicial economy may weigh in favor of squarely addressing issues raised despite procedural irregularity
How later courts described this case
- although single-judge order denying motion to quash would not ordinarily be reconsidered by en banc panel, importance of issue and interests of judicial economy may weigh in favor of squarely addressing issues raised despite procedural irregularity
- “The statement of objections to the governmental determination has been held to constitute the ‘heart5 of the petition for review, and, without it, no issue has been preserved for appellate review.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*206 DOYLE, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
Respectfully, I concur in part and dissent in part. I agree with the majority that IOP 211 is-valid and that where, as here, a pro se letter evidences an intent to appeal, amplification of that pro se document via amendment should be allowed under IOP 211. Further, I agree with the majority’s disposition of the case on the merits of Larocca's appeal. I dissent, however, from its position on the issue pertaining to reconsideration of an order of a single judge. 1
Assuming that the law of the case doctrine does apply here, and I do not agree that it does, the authority relied upon by the majority is Vitale v. Zoning Hearing Board of Upper Darby Township, 63 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 604 , 438 A.2d 1016 (1982). However, Vitale , by its own language states that reconsideration of a trial judge’s interlocutory order in the same case, as a general rule, is not to be considered and that the rule’s sole justification is judicial economy (a public policy rationale, not a statutory or constitutional one). Hence, the rule is not an absolute. In this case the issue is the timeliness of an appeal to this Court and goes to our subject matter jurisdiction. Altieri v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 88 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 592, 495 A.2d 213 (1985). Moreover, we are obliged to consider subject matter jurisdiction defects sua sponte. Id. Thus, in my view the Vitale rule can not operate to preclude us from reconsidering this issue.
As previously noted, however, I disagree that this situation even involves the law of the case doctrine. On this point I am in agreement with the concurring and dissenting opinion of Judge Byer that “a prior decision of a single judge on a pre-argument or pre-submission application cannot be considered the law of the case in the same appeal” because “[i]t simply is not a prior decision of an appellate court for this purpose.” See Farber v. Engle, 106 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 173, 525 A.2d 864 (1987). I cannot, however, join fully in Judge Byer’s concurring and dissenting opinion on this issue because I disagree with that opinion to the *207 extent that it relies on the dissent in Gilmore v. Commonwealth, 139 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 499, 590 A.2d 1369 (1991) (Byer, J., dissenting) to support its position. 2
In summary, I would hold that IOP 211 is valid, that there is no bar to our sua sponte reconsideration of the single judge’s order in this case, that the case is validly on appeal here, and that the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board should be affirmed on the merits.
. I do agree that the issue is an important one and must be reached.
. Because I believe that IOP 211 is valid, I disagree with the dissent that nunc pro tunc relief is required here.