recognizing that the passage of fifteen minutes was “considerably longer than the delay involved in [the Court’s] past decisions on point”
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that the passage of fifteen minutes was “considerably longer than the delay involved in [the Court’s] past decisions on point”
- holding that tip lacked specificity sufficient to justify stop of group suspected of selling drugs
- noting that “when the citizen appears to have personally observed a crime, ‘the reliability of his or her information is greatly enhanced’ ”
- walking away fas t not sufficie nt, as it is nec essary tha t “the m anner o f flight sugg ests consc iousnes s of guilt rathe r than a m ere des ire not to intera ct with the po lice”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*1026 KERN, Senior Judge,
concurring:
When the police arrived at the intersection in northwest Washington where they effected a Terry-stop 1 of appellant, at least fifteen minutes had elapsed since they received a citizen’s complaint by telephone that drugs were being sold there. The police had no descriptions from the complainant caller of the persons allegedly observed selling drugs.
Upon the arrival of the police, appellant, who was one of several persons there, walked away at a brisk pace. This court stated in Smith v. United, States, 558 A.2d 312, 319 (D.C.1989) (en banc), that “[f]or flight to suggest consciousness of guilt ... that flight ... must be carried out at such a rate of speed ... or in such an erratic or evasive manner that a guilty conscience is the most reasonable explanation.” I agree that the reaction by appellant to the police arrival did not meet the strict Smith standard. 2
I share with the other members of this panel what the dissent characterizes as “considerable doubt about the proper scope and application of the test” enunciated by the concurring opinion adopted by the majority in Smith . I also agree that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in California v. Hodari D., — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1547 , 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991), may cast further doubt upon the '"correctness of the standard in Smith . Nevertheless, this decision is the law presently and this division is bound by it. See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310 .(D.C.1971).
Therefore, I concur in the holding that under the particular circumstances here the Terry stop was not valid and the judgment of conviction must be reversed.
. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
. I am not persuaded that appellant’s manner of departure, walking away from one police car and into the street with apparent disregard for oncoming traffic so as to step in front of an approaching police car, is so erratic or evasive that a guilty conscience is the most reasonable explanation of appellant’s behavior here.