holding that in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we determine whether sufficient evidence was introduced "for any reasonable juror to have been convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt"
How later courts described this case
- holding that in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we determine whether sufficient evidence was introduced "for any reasonable juror to have been convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt"
- finding two venirepersons were not comparable when the substance of their answers led to different inferences about each venireperson’s disposition
- "the trial or appellate court is [not] permitted to peruse the record to find legitimate reasons why the potential juror ' might have been stricken _The trial 'and appellate courts cannot identify additional reasons why the prosecutor, could have stricken the venireperson but rather must look at whether the reason or reasons given by the prosecutor are race-neutral ....”
- “disproportionate number of strikes against other minority venirepersons [and] the number of minority venirepersons remaining after peremptory strikes ... is significant”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
RICHARD B. TEITELMAN, Judge,
dissenting.
The principal opinion provides an excellent synopsis of the courts’ 130-year struggle to minimize racial bias in jury selection. During this time, the legal standards protecting the right of all jurors to serve gradually have grown more stringent for the simple reason that prior standards fell short. Yet, despite the fact that Batson 1 was decided nearly a quarter century ago, recent cases demonstrate that the bias still exists. Therefore, to this day, prosecutors attempt to justify peremptory strikes of black jurors based on inconsequential matters such as “crazy looking” hair or being employed by the United States Postal Service. 2 The persistence of bias in jury selection demands that the courts continue to enforce the promise of Batson vigorously. This is a close case and, as a result, I would ensure that Bateman’s trial is conducted free of any taint of racially biased *694 jury selection. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the principal opinion to the extent that it finds no Batson violation with respect to the state’s peremptory strike of B.T.
The principal opinion notes, correctly, that while the presence of similarly situated white jurors is a crucial factor, it is not necessarily dispositive because the proper analysis of a Batson claim requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances. However, after recognizing that Batson requires a multi-factor analysis, the principal opinion focuses almost exclusively on a single factor — the conclusion that the black and white jurors at issue are not similarly situated. By focusing on this single factor, the principal opinion overlooks three suspect aspects of this case that, when considered together, indicate a strong likelihood that the state’s justifications for striking juror B.T. were pretextual.
First, the state struck B.T. for the “sole reason” that B.T. allegedly asked about the different degrees of murder before the prosecutor asked the prospective jurors if they could follow the court’s instructions. According to the state, B.T.’s “initiative” in raising the issue demonstrated that B.T. had a “more lenient bend” on matters of crime and punishment. The record conclusively refutes the factual basis for the prosecutor’s justification. B.T. did not raise the issue on his own initiative; he was responding to a direct question by the prosecutor. In common discourse, few people would be persuaded by an argument premised on inaccurate facts. Therefore, when the factual basis underlying the prosecutor’s explanation of a strike is demonstrably inaccurate, the explanation appears more like an after-the-fact justification.
Second, despite being fully apprised of B.T.’s supposed leniency, the state originally did not strike B.T. from the venire panel. Instead, the state struck B.T. after the trial court sustained Bateman’s Batson challenge to another prospective black juror. The assertion that B.T. may exhibit leniency because he took initiative in asking about degrees of murder was apparently not a concern until the state was unsuccessful in attempting to strike a different black venireperson from the jury. The principal opinion notes this fact but does not account for it in considering the totality of the circumstances of this case. These circumstances detract substantially from the credibility of the state’s explanation for striking B.T.
Finally, the principal opinion notes that the trial court previously rejected an earlier strike as pretextual and that this fact indicates the trial court was not hesitant to invoke Batson. No one is arguing that the trial court was unwilling to follow the law. The trial court’s state of mind is not at issue. What is at issue is the prosecutor’s state of mind; specifically, whether B.T. was stricken because of his race or because of a race-neutral reason that logically is related to assessing the evidence at trial. Accordingly, the fact that the trial court previously sustained a Batson challenge is most relevant to showing that, in this case, the prosecutor demonstrated a tendency to utilize pretextual peremptory strikes.
When the foregoing facts are considered, this Court is left with a factually inaccurate justification for a strike made only after the state unsuccessfully attempted to exercise a pretextual strike against another prospective black juror. Given these circumstances, I conclude that the state’s justification for striking B.T. was pretextual. The Batson violation requires the judgment to be reversed and the case to be remanded.
. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 86 (1987).
. State v. McFadden, 216 S.W.3d 673, 676 (Mo. banc 2007)(state unsuccessfully justified peremptory strike by noting a prospective juror's “crazy looking red hair”); State v. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511, 525-28 (Mo. banc 2003)(state unsuccessfully justified peremptory strike by noting a prospective juror worked for the post office).