Opinion

Weinn v. State

  • 326 S.W.3d 189
  • 2010 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 793
  • 2010 WL 2595009
Court
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Filed
Jun 30, 2010
Status
Published
Author
Keasler
On the bench
Johnson, Meyers, Price, Womack, Holcomb, Cochran, Keller, Keasler, Hervey
Cited by
58 cases
Authority
More cited than 10.1%

explaining that, in Guerrero, the “majority, comprised of two concurring judges and three dissenting judges, noted that the legislature did not intend multiple punishments for manufacture and simultaneous possession with intent to deliver with respect to a single quantity of controlled substances.”

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that, in Guerrero, the “majority, comprised of two concurring judges and three dissenting judges, noted that the legislature did not intend multiple punishments for manufacture and simultaneous possession with intent to deliver with respect to a single quantity of controlled substances.”
  • stating that double jeopardy is violated when there is “a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction” (quoting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977))
  • holding a single act of simultaneous manufacture and resulting possession with intent to deliver with respect to a single quantity of a controlled substance constitutes a single violation
  • holding simultaneous manufacture and resulting possession with intent to deliver when involving a single quantity of controlled substance only constitutes one offense

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

KEASLER, J.,

filed a dissenting opinion in which KELLER, P.J., and HERVEY, J., joined.

The majority incorrectly distinguishes the facts of this case from those in our recent decision in Guerrero v. State. 1 But the facts of Guerrero are identical. In Guerrero, a plurality of us held that Guerrero’s convictions for manufacturing and possessing with intent to deliver the same cache of methamphetamine did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 2 Though Guerrero’s manufacture and possession with intent to deliver were close in time, they “were discrete acts with different impulses” — “one impulse to manufacture and another impulse to possess for the purpose of delivering what has been manufactured.” 3 The same can and should be said here. I would therefore hold that there is no jeopardy violation and reverse the court of appeals’s judgment.

. 305 S.W.3d 546 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) (plurality op.).

. Id. at 553-54, 557, 560-61 .

.Id. at 554.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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