Opinion

Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc. v. County of Fayette

  • 593 Pa. 338
  • 929 A.2d 1150
  • 168 Oil & Gas Rep. 238
  • 2007 Pa. LEXIS 1679
Court
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Aug 20, 2007
Status
Published
Author
Saylor
On the bench
Saylor, Cappy, Eakin, Castille, Newman, Baer, Baldwin, Former
Cited by
5 cases

holding that leasehold interests in subsurface limestone were taxable real estate under Section 201(a) since limestone “falls within the term ‘lands’ listed in Section 201.”

How later courts described this case

  • holding that leasehold interests in subsurface limestone were taxable real estate under Section 201(a) since limestone “falls within the term ‘lands’ listed in Section 201.”
  • “[T]he physical characteristics of the fuels was central to [our] Court’s ultimate holding [in Independent Oil and Gas Ass’n ] that oil and gas do not fall within the term ‘lands’ listed in Section 201 of the General County Assessment Law.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Justice SAYLOR,

concurring.

I join the majority opinion. I write only to note that, in the IOGA case, I joined Mr. Justice Nigro’s concurrence, which relied on the special characteristics of oil and gas to support the conclusion that such minerals were beyond the reach of Section 201 of the General County Assessment Law. I appreciated that oil and gas have been termed “real estate” in various decisions, but applying a strict construction of the statute most favorable to the taxpayers, I found sufficient ambiguity in Section 201 with regard to these minerals, in light of their vagrant and fugacious character, to support the taxpayers’ position. However, with regard to solid minerals attached to the earth, on or beneath its surface, there seems to me to be no room for any similar ambiguity-these are almost universally understood to be real estate. See generally 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals § 141 (2007) (“Minerals in place are generally held to be a part of the real estate with all the attributes and incidents peculiar to the ownership of land, but after their removal from the land they become personalty.”). Thus, I conclude that Section 201 was plainly intended to reach them. See 72 P.S. § 5020-201(a) (providing for taxation of “[a]ll real estate” and “all other real estate not exempt by law from taxation”).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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