holding that a nonprofit corporation that acquires and renovates houses in residential neighborhoods with private funds and houses individuals diagnosed with mental retardation and severe physical disabilities with 24-hour supervision with government funds, relieved the government of a burden because the government was required to provide services for the individuals diagnosed with mental retardation under the MH/MR Act and the corporation also provided services that the government was not capable of providing
How later courts described this case
- holding that a nonprofit corporation that acquires and renovates houses in residential neighborhoods with private funds and houses individuals diagnosed with mental retardation and severe physical disabilities with 24-hour supervision with government funds, relieved the government of a burden because the government was required to provide services for the individuals diagnosed with mental retardation under the MH/MR Act and the corporation also provided services that the government was not capable of providing
- “[o]nly the fourth prong of this test, i.e., whether Appellant relieves the government of some of its burden, is at issue in this appeal”
- housing and services for intellectually disabled is charitable purpose and benefits indefinite class of persons who are legitimate subjects of charity
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SAYLOR, Justice,
dissenting.
While I agree with the majority’s formulation of the standard to be applied in evaluating whether an entity reheves the government of some of its burden, I would not reach the merits of whether Appellant satisfies this standard. Instead, my preference would be to remand to the common pleas court, which did not consider the appropriate range of factors because it was bound by Community Service Found., Inc. v. Bucks County Bd. of Assessment and Revision of Taxes, 672 A.2d 373 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996), particularly as the determination *685 of whether an entity qualifies as a purely public charity poses a mixed question of law and fact that is to be determined by the common pleas court in the first instance. See Mars Area Sch. Dist. v. United Presbyterian Women’s Ass’n of N. Am., 554 Pa. 824 , 326, 721 A.2d 360, 361 (1998); Unionville-Chadds Ford Sch. Dist. v. Chester County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 552 Pa. 212, 217 , 714 A.2d 397, 399 (1998).
Justice EAKIN joins this dissenting opinion.