holding that the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing at which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias, and no mistrial was required on a theory of implied bias
How later courts described this case
- holding that the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing at which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias, and no mistrial was required on a theory of implied bias
- claiming that violation of right to trial by impartial jury based on implied bias doctrine
- noting that the issue in Uranga is juror bias and distinguishing Franklin, where the issue was, as it is in the case before us, ―what standard of harm should be applied to the denial of a mistrial based on the juror’s withholding of material information‖
- stating that the implied bias doctrine should be applied in this case and citing. Fifth Circuit opinions that recognize and apply the implied bias doctrine
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MEYERS, J.,
filed a concurring opinion.
I agree with the majority that there was no error in this case. However, I disagree with the path taken to reach that result. Article 37.07, Section 3, of the Code of Criminal Procedure — “Evidence of prior criminal record in all criminal cases after a finding of guilty” — states,
Regardless of the plea and whether the punishment be assessed by the judge or the jury, evidence may be offered by the state and the defendant as to any matter the court deems relevant to sentencing, including but not limited to the prior criminal record of the defendant, his general reputation, his character, an opinion regarding his character, the circumstances of the offense for which he is being tried, and, notwithstanding Rules 404 and 405, Texas Rules of Evidence, any other evidence of an extraneous crime or bad act that is shown beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence to have been committed by the defendant or for which he could be held criminally responsible, regardless of whether he has previously been charged with or finally convicted of the crime or act.
Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 3. Under Article 37.07, the extraneous, unad-judicated offense at issue could properly be offered at the punishment stage. In fact, it seems that jurors are encouraged to punish a defendant in their deliberations for any extraneous offenses offered at the punishment phase. Therefore, the trial court’s hearing on the question of actual bias by this juror and any subsequent discussion regarding a mistrial was unnecessary.
Though I have long disliked Article 37.07’s broad allowance for the consider *308 ation of extraneous crimes, it nevertheless controls the resolution of this case. For this reason, I respectfully concur.