explaining that the exclusion of an expert’s opinion on the ground that he is not licensed in the State of Texas under Tex. Health & Safety Code § 531.003(16) is of no “legal significance in *798 deciding whether [an] applicant is mentally retarded for purposes of eligibility for the death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia or Ex parte Briseno.”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that the exclusion of an expert’s opinion on the ground that he is not licensed in the State of Texas under Tex. Health & Safety Code § 531.003(16) is of no “legal significance in *798 deciding whether [an] applicant is mentally retarded for purposes of eligibility for the death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia or Ex parte Briseno.”
- joining the majority in declining to adopt the trial court's fact findings based on TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 591.003(16) and explaining that whether a physician or psychologist is licensed in Texas is of no "legal significance in deciding whether [an] applicant is mentally retarded for purposes of eligibility for the death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia or Ex parte Briseno"
- "[W]hile there is significant expert opinion testimony, documentary materials, and lay testimony in this record that might support a finding of mental retardation, there is also sufficient evidence, including expert and lay opinion testimony, as well as written records, to support the trial court's finding that applicant failed to prove that he is mentally retarded. In such a situation, I defer to the trial court's credibility determinations and . . . adopt its ultimate findings of fact. Based on those findings and my independent review, I agree with the Court's decision to deny relief."
- trial judge ultimately chose to place greater reliance upon state’s expert than defense expert in concluding that the habeas applicant was not mentally retarded
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WOMACK, J.,
filed a dissenting statement in which JOHNSON and HOLCOMB, JJ., joined.
I believe that all Members of the Court agree that the convicting court has made two problematic findings. In Finding 08, the convicting court found “pursuant to Tex. Health & Safety Code § 591.003[ (16) ], that a ‘person with mental retardation’ means a person determined by a physician or psychologist licensed in this state or certified by the department to met the stated definition of mental retardation.’ ”
In Finding 15, the convicting court found “that Dr. Richard Garnett [the applicant’s expert witness] is not licensed as a psychologist in the State of Texas, but is *379 a licensed professional counselor; that he is not licensed to diagnose mental retardation; that he is not certified by the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation to make a diagnosis of subav-erage general intellectual functioning.”
The problem is that the definition of “person with mental retardation” in Section 591.003(16), which requires a determination by a physician or psychologist licensed or certified, is not part of the definition of mental retardation that is relevant for the Eighth Amendment issue that was before the convicting court. As the convicting court correctly said in Finding 07, we have held that the issue is to be determined by the definition of “mental retardation” in Section 591.003(13) or in the similar definition of the American Association on Mental Retardation. Neither of these relevant definitions requires “a determination by a physician or psychologist, licensed or certified” etc.
This Court deals with the problem by “rejecting]” the problematic findings. Order, ante, at 374-75. But where does that get us? Neither of the findings is false, but neither of them should be the basis of the decision in this case. If the convicting court’s conclusions were based on a mistaken belief that they required a certain expert’s determination, then the severance of the findings that refer to such experts would not cure the mistake. (All the conclusions are based on “ § 591.003,” which contains both the relevant and the irrelevant definitions.)
I should prefer to remand the matter for the convicting court to revise its findings and conclusions to state specifically which standard it is using.