explaining that for Court to reach issue, “[t]he question submitted must not be premature, in that it must be a necessary part of the final disposition of the case to which it pertains”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that for Court to reach issue, “[t]he question submitted must not be premature, in that it must be a necessary part of the final disposition of the case to which it pertains”
- observing that prohibition on advisory opinions requires that appellate question “must be a necessary part of the final disposition of the case to which it pertains” and that “the establishment of legal doctrine derives from the decision of actual disputes, not from the giving of solicited legal advice in anticipation of issues”
- holding it is only appropriate for this Court to resolve questions necessary for disposition of matter
- question to be reviewed "must be a necessary part of the final disposition of the case"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Daley, J.,
Dissenting. I cannot agree with the majority’s decision to answer the legal issue presented by the parties. In view of the limited factual record before us, I believe that the majority’s opinion responding to the propounded issue departs from this Court’s practice of refusing to render advisory opinions. Beecham v. Leahy, 130 Vt. 164, 167 , 287 A.2d 836 (1972); In re Constitutionality of House Bill 88, 115 Vt. 524, 529 , 64 A.2d 169 (1949).
The parties bring this matter before the Court pursuant to the provisions of Rule 5(a) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. In my opinion, this rule contemplates the presence of an adequate factual record, supplied either by an agreed statement of facts or otherwise, so as to enable this Court to properly decide the case. R. Field, V. McKusick, and L. Wroth, Maine Civil Practice § 72.5, at 144 (2d ed. 1970). This Court has, on numerous occasions, *123 refused to answer certified questions where there was “nothing before us on the record to shed any light on the factual situation out of which the certified question has arisen”. State v. Elwell, 131 Vt. 245, 248 , 303 A.2d 134 (1973). See also State v. Preston, 132 Vt. 480, 482 , 321 A.2d 37 (1974); Powers v. State Highway Board, 123 Vt. 1, 5 , 178 A.2d 390 (1962).
The issue answered by the majority finds its sole factual basis in the allegations in the plaintiffs complaint. These allegations under our present rules of practice need not even set forth specific and detailed-statements of the facts; see Reporter’s Notes to V.R.C.P. 8(a). All material claims set forth in this complaint were denied by the defendant. Inasmuch as the method of review provided by V.R.A.P. 5(a) should be exercised with care and caution, State v. Bailey, 286 A.2d 603, 605 (Me. 1972), I believe it is inappropriate as a matter of policy for this Court to resolve an issue of wide-ranging implications in the area of tort and family law upon an inadequate factual record. While I may be in agreement with the majority on the doctrinal principle which is expounded, I cannot subscribe to the method employed to make the determination.