mother who shot her four children rather than see her children taken from her by her husband was legally *336 sane under M’Naghten; lay testimony alone was sufficient to rebut the opinion of three defense psychiatrists that mother was insane
How later courts described this case
- mother who shot her four children rather than see her children taken from her by her husband was legally *336 sane under M’Naghten; lay testimony alone was sufficient to rebut the opinion of three defense psychiatrists that mother was insane
- mother who shot her four children rather than see her children taken from her by her husband was legally sane under M'Naghten; lay testimony alone was sufficient to rebut the opinion of three defense psychiatrists that mother was insane
- “[Wjhile we permit discharged jurors to testify as to the existence of outside influences during their deliberation, nevertheless, we prohibit them from testifying as to the effect which these extra-evidentiary influences had upon the jurors in reaching a decision. ...”
- “[t]he only act performed by the jury to which any legal significance is attached is the [r]endering of the verdict. The verdict as uttered is the sole embodiment of the jury’s act”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled in part by Commonwealth v. Demmitt, 456 Pa. 475 (1974)
See, e. g., Commonwealth v. Zlatovich, 440 Pa. 388, 393, 269 A.2d 469 (1970), overruled in part in Commonwealth v. Demmitt, 456 Pa. 475, 321 A.2d 627 (1974).
The opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
Mb. Justice Robeets:
The majority states that since this Court recently approved the proposition that a criminal defendant has the burden of proving insanity by a preponderance of the evidence in Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1 , 268 A. 2d 89 (1970), “. . . nothing would be gained by further discussion. . . .” They are probably right, but I cannot again allow the affirmance of a conviction based on what I consider to be an erroneous and unwise view *398 of the law to pass unchallenged. To impose criminal punishment upon an individual who was, under the strictest standard, mentally incompetent at the time the “crime” was committed is the height of irrationality. It will not deter future criminal acts, it will not appreciably aid in the unfortunate individual’s rehabilitation, and, arguendo that vengeance is at least a de facto element of our criminal law, it is barbaric to so punish one who could not control his actions. As I said in Vogel, supra: “For a defendant to be guilty of murder, the ‘muscular contraction’ must be coupled with a mens rea—‘malice aforethought express or implied.’ Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, 15 (1868). This mens rea is as much an element of the crime of murder as is the physical act of killing,” 440 Pa. at 15 , 268 A. 2d at 90 , and the Commonwealth should have the burden of proving defendant’s sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
I dissent.