The opinion
ARDAIZ, P. J., Concurring.
I concur in the result. I write separately to express my view regarding the assessment of a community/recreation facility impact fee. In the instant case, the City of Lemoore imposed a fee pursuant to Government Code section 66000 et seq., regarding a category of desired potential municipal improvements such as a municipal aquatic center, a municipal gymnasium and fitness center and a naval air museum. Appellant objects that the specific facility is not clearly identified and therefore complains that it must be specifically identified. As noted in the majority opinion “reference was made to examples of future facilities without any actual plan or commitment.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 564.)
I agree with the majority that a class of projects may be identified as opposed to a specific project. However, that resolution does not address my concern regarding the nature of the class of projects in terms of relationship to the specific development. Government Code section 66000 specifically provides within its definition of a “fee” that it is a monetary exaction “imposed on a specific project on an ad hoc basis, that is charged by a local agency to the applicant in connection with approval of a development project for the purpose of defraying all or a portion of the cost of public facilities related to the development project. . . .” (§ 66000, subd. (b), italics added.)
Government Code section 66001 addresses the duties of the local agency in regard to the fee and provides in pertinent part, “Determine how there is a reasonable relationship between the fee’s use and the type of development project on which the fee is imposed.” (§ 66001, subd. (a)(3), italics added.)
Specifically, my concern is the category of municipal improvements designated as justification for the fee in question. Using general rules of construction, there are two that have bearing here. Noscitur a sociis, it is known from its associates, means that a word may be defined by an accompanying word. Ejusdem generis, of the same kind, means that general words are construed to *576 embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the specific word. (2A Singer & Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction (2007 new ed.) §§ 47:16 to 47:17.) In the context of this case, I would conclude that the specific facilities identified such as a municipal aquatic center and a naval air museum identify the class of projects referred to. Or, to be specific, the class of projects referred to would be reasonably identified as communitywide projects, which is precisely how they were described.
This brings me to the specific concern that I raise. Government Code sections 66000 and 66001 refer to a fee related to the development project. The term “related” would in its normal usage mean associated with or having a close connection to. (Webster’s New World Diet. (2d college ed. 1982) p. 1198.) I would infer from this that the proposed specific project or class of projects must be a consequence of or have a direct relationship to the proposed development.
I have no argument that the proposed class of municipal projects herein is not desirable or beneficial. However, I have great difficulty concluding that their desirability or need are a consequence of or have a direct relationship to the proposed project herein. That a community may be desirous of celebrating its military heritage is laudable. However, it is a community benefit that springs from an expression of the nature of the community atmosphere and culture. Likewise, an aquatic center is a desirable and useful thing but it is difficult to infer how its need springs from the project herein.
Clearly as population expands or shifts, more and different infrastructure facilities are required. New population centers require building new elementary schools and new roads, etc. However, there is a significant difference between building a new elementary school or a new high school that may service more than just the development and a facility that services the entire community. That a community grows and the nature of the population changes relates to policy decisions that fall upon the entire community as opposed to one aspect of the community. In other words, the fact that a new development may increase traffic on a central roadway does not mean that the new development should be responsible for building a freeway. Such responsibilities should fall equally within the community, and in my view to link it to a specific development is a tenuous thread. Utilizing that type of reasoning justifies a development fee for almost anything and I do not glean that type of result from the words of this statute.
Appellant argues, as it did before the trial court, that failure to identify a specific project violates the provision of Government Code section 66001, subdivision (a)(2) that the “facilities shall be identified,” likewise the provisions of Government Code section 66006, subdivision (b)(1)(E) requiring *577 “[a]n identification of each public improvement” as well as related statutes with similar language. While I do not read the statute so narrowly, I would contend that the failure to identify a specific project could deprive the developer of any reasonable ability to determine if the specific project is reasonably related to the proposed fee. On the other hand, a listing of projects that clearly would relate to the development such as increased sewage, schools, water, et cetera, does define projects that on the surface do bear a reasonable relationship to the normal infrastructure facilities generated by a new development.
The impact of allowing general community municipal improvements without any realistic showing as to how they bear a direct or reasonable relationship to the proposed development raises serious issues as to whether the statute herein does justify the fees imposed for the proposed improvements. I do not accept that simply concluding a particular general municipal improvement benefits the community as a whole and necessarily a specific development within that community somehow supports the conclusion that it is related to a specific development.
The majority concludes by footnote that the specific nature of the facility was not argued as opposed to the contention that the specific identity of the project must be specified, in other words, that the specific issue was not preserved for appeal. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 566, fn. 2.) In my view the issue is at best ambiguous as to whether the general argument subsumes the specific but I do agree that the specific argument directed toward my concern was not raised. I write separately to ensure no implication that inferentially I accept the conclusion that the projects indicated herein are justified under the statute. In my view, absent some showing of a more direct and specific relationship between the municipal improvement and the proposed development, such fees are seriously subject to question.
Petitions for a rehearing were denied July 8, 2010, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied September 22, 2010, S184580. Baxter, J., did not participate therein.