finding that even though ordinary drivers may be competent to testify about personal experiences in traffic backup, testimony of lay witnesses was insufficient to establish existence of legal duty to place warning signs over three miles away from construction zone; trial court grant of summary judgment reinstated
How later courts described this case
- finding that even though ordinary drivers may be competent to testify about personal experiences in traffic backup, testimony of lay witnesses was insufficient to establish existence of legal duty to place warning signs over three miles away from construction zone; trial court grant of summary judgment reinstated
- holding that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the appellants because the appellees failed to “offer[] any expert testimony or evidence [to] show that [the a]ppellants owed a duty, breached that duty, or were causally responsible for the accident” in support of their negligence claim
- noting that under Pa.RX.P. No. 1035.2, grant of summary judgment is proper when "an adverse party who will bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce evidence of facts essential to the causes of action ... which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted to a jury”
- noting that under Pa.R.C.P. No. 1035.2, grant of summary judgment is proper when “an adverse party who will bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce evidence of facts essential to the causes of action … which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted to a jury”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*380 NIGRO, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent, as the record does not support that Appellants Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) and Driscoll Construction Company, Inc. complied with even the minimal mandates attendant to placement of warning signs approaching work zones. Pursuant to § 203.43(a) of the Pennsylvania Code, PennDOT and Driscoll had a statutory duty to erect and maintain warning signs in order to alert drivers of unusual road conditions occasioned by work zones. 1 Furthermore, § 203.43(b)(7) provides that there shall be warning signs at least one mile in advance of a work zone located on a road where the posted speed limit is 50 to 55 miles per hour. 2 Moreover, § 203.43(b)(7)(i) further provides that whenever a work zone is anticipated to cause slowing or queuing of vehicles in advance of the one-mile sign, additional advance warning signs should be installed. 3
I find that the record does not support the proposition that Appellants complied with these statutes and therefore I would find that they were negligent per se. As such, even absent expert testimony, this matter should have been permitted to proceed to trial for a determination as to whether PennDOT’s and Driscoll’s negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about the Youngs’ accident.
. § 203.43(a) states:
Function of warning signs. Warning signs are used to notify drivers of unusual conditions or potential hazards associated with work zones. Drivers should be properly alerted of unusual conditions and potential hazards in sufficient time to adjust their speed and driving practices to the impending conditions.
67 Pa.Code § 203.43(a).
. "(7) Location of advance warning signs for long term operations shall comply with Table 2 [providing for warning signs where the normal speed limit on the approach to the work area is 50 or 55 MPH to be placed at 1 mile, ]k mile, 1500 feet, 1000 feet and 500 feet] ...” 67 Pa.Code § 203.43(b)(7) and Table 2.
. "(i) On high volume highways where the slowing or queuing of vehicles is anticipated to occur in advance of the location of the [one mile] sign additional advance warning signs should be installed.”
67 Pa.Code § 203.43(b)(7)(i).